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AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF MORTGAGOR
PROTECTION LAWS
Michael H. Schill*
0 VER the past decade real estate credit markets have been trans-
formed from locally segmented mortgage markets into an inte-
grated national capital market.1 Integration of real estate credit
markets with the national capital market has led lawyers, policymak-
ers, and academics to reexamine the legal rules governing real estate
finance, heretofore one of the most venerable areas of the law and one
of the areas most impervious to change. Among the laws that have
been subjected to particularly strong criticism are those that protect
mortgagors from the adverse effects of mortgage default and foreclo-
sure, such as prohibitions on deficiency judgments and statutory
rights of redemption. These mortgagor protection laws have been
attacked on the grounds that they increase the cost of home credit
without any corresponding benefit to borrowers.2
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Pennsylvania. A.B. 1980, Princeton University;
J.D. 1984, Yale University. I would like to thank Ed Baker, Curt Berger, Steve Burbank, John
Donohue, Bob Ellickson, Richard Epstein, Joe Gyourko, Seth Kreimer, Chuck Mooney,
Stephen Morse, Matthew Richman, Alan Schwartz and Michael Wachter for providing
comments on earlier drafts. In particular I would like to express my gratitude to my colleague
Elizabeth Warren who has supported me in this project over the past two years and who has
made countless helpful suggestions. The research assistance of Michael Boldin, Bill Carter,
Joseph Franklin and Anne Fremault and financial assistance from the Education Trust Fund
of the Mortgage Bankers Association and the Institute for Law and Economics of the
University of Pennsylvania are greatly appreciated. I, of course, bear sole responsibility for the
opinions expressed and for any remaining errors.
I See generally A. Downs, The Revolution in Real Estate Finance (1985) (discussing the
revolution that occurred in the late 1970s and early 1980s in U.S. real estate finance and the
institutions that provide it, including the greater integration of capital markets and the
increased importance of secondary mortgage markets).
2 See infra notes 26-35 and accompanying text. State mortgagor protection laws have also
been criticized for impeding the growth of national mortgage markets. See, e.g., United States
v. Stadium Apartments, 425 F.2d 358, 364 (9th Cir.) (refusing to borrow state statutory right
of redemption as federal common law), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 926 (1970); Unif. Land
Transactions Act, prefatory note, 13 U.L.A. 469, 470 (1986) (stating that variance in state real
estate law is an impediment to secondary mortgage markets); G. Nelson & D. Whitman, Real
Estate Finance Law § 8.8, at 631 (2d ed. 1985) (criticizing state foreclosure laws as a "luxury
of federalism we can ill continue to afford"). For a critical analysis of these arguments see
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Debates over whether to repeal mortgagor protection laws have
been informed by remarkably little theory and even less empirical evi-
dence. 3  In this Article I attempt to fill this void by examining
whether mortgagor protection laws can be justified as promoting eco-
nomic efficiency. 4 In Part I, I briefly describe existing mortgagor pro-
tection laws and summarize the criticisms leveled against them. I
argue that critics of mortgagor protection laws have erred in focusing
their analysis on ex post considerations. Instead, I propose that the
focus should be on reconceptualizing mortgagor protection laws as a
form of insurance against the adverse effects of default and foreclo-
sure. Viewed in this way, mortgagor protections might promote eco-
nomic efficiency, even though, as an ex post matter, they are not
frequently exercised by borrowers.
In Part II, I examine the costs of mortgagor protection laws. The
few empirical studies that have examined mortgagor protection laws
conclude that they generate substantial costs. My analysis of the costs
of mortgagor protection laws proceeds on two fronts. First, I present
and test a net present value simulation model of mortgage lending.
Schill, Uniformity or Diversity: Residential Real Estate Finance Law in the 1990s and the
Implications of Changing Financial Markets, 64 S. Cal. L. Rev. - (forthcoming July 1991).
3 See T. Sullivan, E. Warren & J. Westbrook, As We Forgive Our Debtors: Bankruptcy and
Consumer Credit in America 143, 146 n.19 (1989) (observing that few empirical studies
examine whether giving homebuyers additional mortgage protection would lead to higher
interest rates, and stating that in the absence of empirical data, "the arguments about the high
costs of additional consumer rights remain matters of faith on all sides"); see also infra notes
27-33 and accompanying text (summarizing existing studies on the effects of mortgagor
protection laws).
4 My focus in this Article is exclusively on issues of economic efficiency. The measure of
efficiency used is Kaldor-Hicks efficiency. A given allocation of resources is Kaldor-Hicks
efficient if those made better off could compensate those made worse off. To meet the
requirements of Kaldor-Hicks efficiency, actual compensation need not be paid. See G. Downs
& P. Larkey, The Search for Government Efficiency 7 (1986). I do not mean to imply by this
emphasis on efficiency that the desirability of mortgagor protection laws depends exclusively
on whether or not they promote economic efficiency. To the contrary, other values may be of
great importance. Mortgagor protection laws may redistribute income from wealthy and
middle-income homebuyers to those who are less fortunate. In addition, mortgagor protection
laws, at least as applied to homeowners, may protect the "personhood" interest of the
individual. Cf. Baker, Property and Its Relation to Constitutionally Protected Liberty, 134 U.
Pa. L. Rev. 741, 762 (1986) (noting that a person might identify her personhood with a
particular house); Radin, Property and Personhood, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 957, 1002-08 (1982)
(noting that a home may be bound up with one's identity). Nevertheless, most criticisms of
mortgagor protection laws have been based on efficiency grounds, thereby inviting a response
in kind. Additionally, economic efficiency is an important, albeit not the exclusive, objective of
our legal system.
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The results of the simulation indicate that home mortgage loan inter-
est rates are relatively insensitive to the existence of mortgagor pro-
tection laws and that the incremental costs of these laws are likely to
be quite modest. Next, I use multiple regression analysis to estimate
the effect of state mortgagor protection laws on state interest rates. I
find that the results of the regression analysis are consistent with the
net present value simulation: mortgagor protection laws have a much
smaller effect on state interest rates than previous studies indicate.
Although I am unable to conclude definitively that the benefits of
mortgagor protection laws exceed their costs because of the absence of
data with respect to the benefits they generate, the relatively modest
costs associated with state mortgagor protection laws do suggest that
mortgagor protections may indeed promote economic efficiency.
Nevertheless, the observation that mortgagor protections might be
efficient does not necessarily justify government intervention. The
desirability of government intervention on efficiency grounds requires
identifying a market failure that government action can reduce or cor-
rect. In Part III, I examine whether the private market can be relied
upon to supply an optimal level of mortgagor protections. I conclude
that the market is unlikely to supply an efficient level of protection
because of imperfect information on the part of both lenders and
borrowers.
In Part IV, I examine what form of government intervention, if
any, would be appropriate to correct this market failure. Government
dissemination of information is unlikely to alleviate all of the
problems generated by imperfect information. Mandatory mortgagor
protection laws may promote efficiency, especially if the government
is able to estimate and to require the level of protection that the mar-
ket would provide if both lenders and borrowers were fully informed.
Based upon my conceptualization of mortgagor protection laws as
insurance, I propose that states choosing to adopt these laws limit
their scope to homeowners. In addition, state legislators who wish to
protect mortgagors, but do not favor statutory rights of redemption or
deficiency judgment prohibitions, might consider adopting an alterna-
tive form of mortgagor protection-a compulsory system of mortgage
foreclosure insurance.
1991]
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I. RECONCEPTUALIZING MORTGAGOR PROTECTION LAWS
The historical development of real estate finance law has been char-
acterized by legislative and judicial efforts to mediate the tension
between the rights of creditors and borrowers. In the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, a borrower who secured a loan with real property
conveyed his or her property to the lender in fee simple subject to the
condition that if the loan was repaid by a specified date, the lender's
estate in land would end. If the borrower failed to repay the loan as
promised, then title would remain vested in the lender. To ameliorate
the harshness of these forfeiture provisions, courts of equity permitted
borrowers to redeem their property after default by paying the lender
the principal balance and accumulated interest. The uncertainty gen-
erated by a borrower's "equity of redemption," however, created diffi-
culties for lenders who needed to know when they would be free to
use or sell the land. In response, equity courts developed an action,
the foreclosure of the equity of redemption, in which a lender could
petition the court to cut off the borrower's equity of redemption, leav-
ing the lender with an estate in fee simple.'
As the twentieth century draws to a close, real estate transactions
have become a good deal more complicated. Nevertheless, the same
tensions between mortgagor and mortgagee continue to shape and
reshape legal doctrine. At present, few states permit the type of strict
foreclosure that prevailed under the common law.6 Instead, all states
allow mortgagees to bring an action in court to foreclose mortgage
liens. After a statutorily prescribed notice, a hearing is held at which
evidence is presented with respect to the mortgagor's default, the
amount of the unpaid loan balance, and any defenses of the mortga-
gor. If the judge finds that the mortgagor has defaulted under the
terms of the loan, she will order the property sold at a foreclosure
sale. At any time prior to the sale of the property, the mortgagor may
redeem his property by paying the principal balance together with all
accrued interest, penalties, late charges, and court costs. If the mort-
gagor fails to exercise his equity of redemption, the property will be
sold to the highest bidder at a public sale conducted by the court or its
5 For a more detailed description of the historical development of the doctrine of "strict
foreclosure," see G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 2, §§ 1.2-1.3, at 6-9.
6 Only two states permit strict foreclosure. See Conn. Gen. Stat. § 49-15 (1983); Vt. Stat.
Ann. tit. 12, § 4528 (1973).
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agent. This purchaser takes title to the property free of any interests
that were subordinate to the foreclosed mortgage. The mortgagor and
junior lienors retain only those property interests expressly provided
for by statute or common law.7
Just over half of the states permit mortgagors and mortgagees to
agree to a power of sale foreclosure in lieu of a judicial foreclosure.'
A power of sale foreclosure allows the mortgagee, if such power is
expressly provided for in the mortgage documents, 9 to sell the prop-
erty without resorting to a judicial proceeding. Mortgagees generally
favor power of sale foreclosures because they are quicker and less
costly than judicial foreclosure.
One of the primary objectives of mortgage foreclosure law is to
have the sheriff, judge, or trustee sell the property for a price that
equals its fair market value. For several reasons, however, this rarely
occurs. Public auctions are less than optimal environments for maxi-
mizing the price offered for real estate. Because of its unique charac-
ter, real property is not an extremely fungible asset. Frequently,
properties must be marketed for long periods of time before they gen-
erate high bids. In addition, foreclosed properties are seldom avail-
able for inspection prior to the foreclosure sale, thereby increasing a
potential purchaser's risk. Furthermore, purchasers must generally
pay cash for the property at the time of the auction or shortly thereaf-
ter. These impediments typically result in the mortgagee purchasing
the property at the foreclosure sale for a nominal bid.10
7 See infra notes 17-22 and accompanying text (describing statutory rights of redemption).
s See, e.g., Ark. Stat. Ann. §§ 18-50-101 to -116 (Supp. 1989); Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 2924
(West 1989).
9 Typically, in states that permit power of sale foreclosures, the property is secured by a
deed of trust rather than a mortgage. The borrower conveys the property securing the loan to
a trustee who holds title in trust for the lender. In the event that the borrower defaults under
the loan, the property may be sold by the trustee at a public sale after notice has been given to
the borrower. By adding this third party, the deed of trust increases the likelihood that the
foreclosure sale will be conducted in a manner that minimizes conflicts of interest.
10 See Wechsler, Through the Looking Glass: Foreclosure by Sale as De Facto Strict
Foreclosure-An Empirical Study of Mortgage Foreclosure and Subsequent Resale, 70
Cornell L. Rev. 850, 870 (1985) (finding, based on a study of 118 foreclosure sales occurring in
Onondaga County, N.Y. in 1979, that mortgagees purchased the property 75% of the time).
One of the reasons mortgagees typically purchase properties at foreclosure sales is that they do
not have to pay additional cash: they can bid up to the outstanding loan balance without owing
any additional cash.
1991] 493
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In the unusual case of the foreclosure sale obtaining a price in
excess of the amount owed to the foreclosing mortgagee,' 1 the surplus
is paid first to junior lienors who have been joined in the foreclosure
action, and then any remaining funds are paid to the mortgagor.
When the foreclosure sale price is less than the debt owed to the mort-
gagee, the mortgagee may proceed against the borrower for a defi-
ciency judgment in the amount of the shortfall if the terms of the loan
allow such an action.
Many states have adopted mortgagor protection laws to alleviate
the hardships that accompany mortgage foreclosure. Frequently,
mortgagor protection laws may not be waived by the mortgagor. 2
One form of mortgagor protection, anti-deficiency judgment legisla-
tion, addresses the problem of personal liability by limiting the ability
of mortgagees to sue mortgagors for deficiencies that remain after the
foreclosure sale. Some states, for instance, prohibit deficiency judg-
ments if the mortgagor used the loan proceeds to purchase a resi-
dence.13 Other states prohibit deficiency judgments only when a
particular type of foreclosure process is utilized, most commonly a
power of sale foreclosure. 14 A number of states, while permitting
mortgagees to sue mortgagors for deficiency judgments, regulate how
the judgment can be obtained and its amount. For example, some
states require that mortgagees seek deficiency judgments at the same
time they foreclose on the mortgage. 5 Others limit the amount of
the deficiency judgment to the difference between the principal bal-
ln One of the reasons sale prices in excess of debt are unusual is that such a result indicates
that the mortgagor has equity in the property. Provided that transaction costs are less than the
amount of mortgagor equity, a profit-maximizing mortgagor should sell the property and pay
off the mortgagee rather than submit to foreclosure.
12 See, e.g., Valinda Builders v. Bissner, 230 Cal. App. 2d 106, 40 Cal. Rptr. 735 (1964)
(deficiency judgment protection not waivable at time loan is made); Mace v. Norwood, 155
Kan. 302, 124 P.2d 497 (1942) (statutory right of redemption not waivable).
13 See, e.g., Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 33-814(G) (1990) (prohibiting deficiency judgments
when the trust property is 2.5 acres or smaller and is used as a one or two family residence);
Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580b (West 1976) (prohibiting deficiency judgments when a purchase
money mortgage or deed of trust is foreclosed, if the property is used as a dwelling by the
borrower).
14 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code § 580d (West 1976) (prohibiting deficiency judgments
when the property is foreclosed under a power of sale).
15 See, e.g., Mont. Code Ann. § 71-1-222 (1989) (one action for recovery on debt secured by
a mortgage); Nev. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 40.430 (Michie Supp. 1989) (same).
[Vol. 77:489
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ance and the property's fair market value at the time of foreclosure, as
opposed to the foreclosure sale price. 16
Roughly half of the states have adopted a second form of mortga-
gor protection-the statutory right of redemption. 17 Under the typi-
cal statutory right of redemption, the mortgagor and other persons
with an interest in the property"' are permitted, after the foreclosure
sale, to buy back the property from the foreclosure sale purchaser.
The redemption price is usually the price obtained at the foreclosure
sale. 19 The period of time during which statutes allow the mortgagor
to exercise his statutory right ranges from three months to two years
after the foreclosure sale.20 In addition, most states permit the mort-
gagor to remain in possession of the property throughout the redemp-
tion period.21  As with anti-deficiency judgment laws, however,
statutory rights of redemption may apply only to certain types of bor-
rowers and certain methods of foreclosure. 22
Statutory rights of redemption have been justified on several
grounds. To begin with, allowing mortgagors to remain in possession
of their property during the redemption period eases the inevitable
16 See, e.g., N.Y. Real Prop. Acts. Law § 1371 (McKinney 1979) (court determines market
value); S.C. Code Ann. §§ 29-3-660 to -740 (Law. Co-op. 1976) (defendant may request
appraisal).
17 See A. Axelrod, C. Berger & Q. Johnstone, Land Transfer and Finance: Cases and
Materials 296 (3d ed. 1986).
18 Among those who might have an interest sufficient to permit them to redeem the
property are junior lenors and life tenants. See G. Nelson & D. Whitman, supra note 2, § 8.5,
at 619.
19 In addition to the foreclosure sale purchase price, the purchaser at the foreclosure sale is
also usually entitled to reimbursement for the costs of the sale and interest on the sales price
from the date of the sale to the redemption. See, e.g., Iowa Code Ann. § 628.11 (West 1950 &
Supp. 1990); Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2414(a) (1983). But see Mo. Rev. Stat. § 443.410 (1978)
(mortgagor must pay the amount of the debt, with interest, and other items to foreclosure sale
purchaser).
20 Compare Wyo. Stat. § 1-18-103 (1989) (three month redemption period) with S.D.
Codified Laws Ann. § 21-52-13 (1987) (redemption period may be extended to two years).
21 See, e.g., Ropfogel v. Enegren, 7 Kan. App. 2d 644, 646 P.2d 1138 (1982); G. Nelson &
D. Whitman, supra note 2, § 8.4, at 616.
22 See, e.g., Idaho Code § 45-1508 (Supp. 1990) (no statutory right of redemption when
deed of trust foreclosed); Mont. Code Ann. §§ 71-1-228, 71-1-301 to -321 (1989) (no statutory
right of redemption in power of sale foreclosure of property with less than 30 acres); see also
Bauer, Judicial Foreclosure and Statutory Redemption: The Soundness of Iowa's Traditional
Preference for Protection over Credit, 71 Iowa L. Rev. 1, 5 n.11 (1985) (descriptions of
variations among state statutory right of redemption laws).
HeinOnline  -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 495 1991
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 77:489
disruption of foreclosure.23 In addition, the redemption right gives
mortgagors who may have encountered temporary financial difficul-
ties the chance to recover their property once they have gotten them-
selves back on their feet.24 Furthermore, at least in theory, the
existence of a statutory right of redemption should encourage pur-
chasers at foreclosure sales to bid up the price to fair market value in
order to avoid the risk of the property being redeemed at an artifi-
cially low foreclosure price several months later.2
Anti-deficiency judgment laws and statutory rights of redemption
have been harshly criticized by scholars and policymakers. Virtually
all critiques of these mortgagor protection laws examine them from
an ex post perspective, finding that they create high costs that are
passed on to borrowers without generating any substantial benefits for
those borrowers.26 For example, Mark Meador, in examining the
effect of state laws on interest rates for home mortgage loans, 27 found
23 See Bauer, supra note 22, at 70-71; Wechsler, supra note 10, at 860 n.71.
24 See Poteat, State Legislative Relief for the Mortgage Debtor During the Depression, 5
Law & Contemp. Probs. 517, 526 (1938).
25 See Bauer, Statutory Redemption Reconsidered: The Operation of Iowa's Redemption
Statute in Two Counties Between 1881 and 1980, 70 Iowa L. Rev. 343, 412 (1985); Poteat,
supra note 24, at 526. Federal laws also may afford foreclosed-upon mortgagors an
opportunity to reacquire their homes. Several federal appellate courts have interpreted the
Bankruptcy Code to give mortgagors protection against low foreclosure sale prices. See
Durrett v. Washington Nat'l Ins. Co., 621 F.2d 201, 203 (5th Cir. 1980) (setting aside a
foreclosure sale that brought less than 58% of the market value of the property as a fraudulent
conveyance, and stating that the court was unable to find any sale yielding less than 70% of
fair market value that was approved by the courts); see also, e.g., In re Huhm, 738 F.2d 323
(8th Cir. 1984) (adopting the Durrett rule that the price received at a foreclosure sale is not
necessarily "reasonable equivalent value" for purposes of determining whether a fraudulent
conveyance has occurred). One commentator has found that there is no correlation between
mortgage loan interest rates and jurisdictions that are subject to the Durrett rule. Schuchman,
Data on the Durrett Controversy, 9 Cardozo L. Rev. 605, 607 (1987).
26 See, e.g., Dietrich, The Montana Judicial and Non-Judicial Foreclosure Sale: Analysis
and Suggestions for Reform, 49 Mont. L. Rev. 285, 322 (1988) (redemption statutes increase
cost of credit); Platt, Deficiency Judgments in Oregon Loans Secured by Land: Growing
Disparity Among Functional Equivalents, 23 Willamette L. Rev. 37, 49 (1987) (arguing that
"the debtor's statutory right to redeem is chimerical" and that it succeeds only in lengthening
the foreclosure proceeding and increasing lender costs).
27 Meador, The Effects of Mortgage Laws on Home Mortgage Rates, 34 J. Econ. & Bus.
143 (1982). Meador examined the effects of both laws prohibiting deficiency judgments and
laws extending the time for foreclosure. The variable for laws that extend the time for
foreclosure includes the statutory right of redemption, as long as the mortgagor is allowed to
remain in possession of the property during the redemption period. See id. at 145. Meador
examined the effects of these laws on interest rates for the period 1973 to 1976. Id. at 143 n.1.
496
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that the existence of a law prohibiting deficiency judgments added
13.87 basis points28 to the interest rate charged on loans secured by
newly constructed homes.29 Meador's estimates also indicate that the
existence of a statutory right of redemption that increased by eleven
months the time it took to complete the foreclosure process would
add 17.42 basis points to the interest rate charged by lenders.3 0 A
separate study by Austin Jaffe analyzed data from 1975 to 1980. 1'
Jaffe concluded, similarly, that statutory rights of redemption were
significantly related to higher home mortgage loan interest rates.32 A
more recent analysis of data from 1980 to 1986 concluded that a
twelve month statutory right of redemption increased the losses
incurred by private mortgage insurers by 21.05 basis points and that
anti-deficiency judgment laws increased losses by 35.85 basis points.3 3
In addition to the costs they generate, mortgagor protection laws,
especially statutory rights of redemption, are often criticized for fail-
ing to assist mortgagors. In particular, commentators point out that
few mortgagors redeem their properties after foreclosure. 34 Further-
more, statutory rights of redemption probably chill, rather than pro-
28 A basis point is equal to one one-hundredth of a percentage point.
29 Meador, supra note 27, at 146. For loans secured by existing homes, Meador estimated
that anti-deficiency judgment laws increased the interest rate by 22.65 basis points. Id.
30 See id. Meador found that the existence of a three month extension of the foreclosure
period raised the interest rate by 4.75 basis points (new home). Among states with statutory
rights of redemption, the mean redemption period is 11 months. Meador also reported that for
loans secured by existing homes, the interest rate increased 38.81 basis points for an 11 month
statutory right of redemption (10.04 basis points for three months). Id.
31 See A. Jaffe, Mortgage Foreclosure Law and Regional Disparities of Mortgage Financing
Costs 25-26 (Pennsylvania State University, College of Business Administration Working
Paper No. 85-05, 1985).
32 Id. at 25-26. Despite this conclusion, Jaffe's regression analysis shows that in only one of
the six years under study was the relationship between statutory rights of redemption and
interest rates statistically significant at the 90% confidence level. See id. at 23.
33 Clauretie, State Foreclosure Laws, Risk Shifting, and the Private Mortgage Insurance
Industry, 56 J. Risk & Ins. 544, 551 (1989).
34 See, e.g., Platt, supra note 26, at 49 (arguing that absent some extraordinary stroke of
luck, "the debtor's statutory right to redeem is chimerical"); Shattuck, Security Transactions,
36 Wash. L. Rev. 303, 311 (1961) (0.4% of mortgagors in Washington State redeemed from
1956-1960); Note, Foreclosures, Redemptions and Homeowners, 1975 U. Ml1. L.F. 335, 351-52
(1.4% and 0.8% of mortgagors redeemed in Cook County, Illinois in 1964 and 1974,
respectively). But see Bauer, supra note 25, at 369 (10.4% of mortgagors in two Iowa counties
redeemed from 1881-1980); Comment, Oregon's Statutory Right of Redemption-Any
Redeeming Qualities?, 16 Willamette L. Rev. 891, 903-04 (1980) (9.8% redemption rate in
three Oregon counties over an eight to ten year period during the 1970s).
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mote, bidding at foreclosure sales because of uncertainty over whether
or not the mortgagor will redeem the property. a5
Ex post critiques of mortgagor protection laws miss an important
economic function of the laws that can be appreciated only from an ex
ante perspective. The benefits generated by these laws may have little
to do with the number of times statutory rights of redemption are
actually exercised or whether these rights induce purchasers at fore-
closure sales to bid up prices. Rather, mortgagor protection laws may
promote economic efficiency by serving as a form of insurance against
the adverse effects of mortgage default and foreclosure.
Most people are thought to be risk-averse. Insurance reduces the
risk associated with a venture and promotes economic efficiency by
pooling together a large number of uncorrelated, individual risks.
Each individual contributes to a fund out of which losses are indemni-
fied, thereby eliminating or minimizing her own risk or level of uncer-
tainty.36 Insurance also minimizes the aggregate level of risk in
society by virtue of the law of large numbers: as the number of pooled
risks increases, the probability of an unfortunate event occurring
becomes more readily predictable.37
Insurance promotes economic efficiency by serving as an intermedi-
ary between people with high and low marginal utilities for capital.
Most people exhibit a declining marginal utility for money.38 Insured
individuals pay their premiums out of "low" utility dollars. These
35 See Durfee & Doddridge, Redemption From Foreclosure Sale-The Uniform Mortgage
Act, 23 Mich. L. Rev. 825, 841 n.51 (1925) (redemption deters bidders because people want to
purchase property for immediate use); Platt, supra note 26, at 49 (statutory rights of
redemption discourage bidders); Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative Response to Price
Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. Cal. L. Rev. 843, 931 (1980) ('The existence
of the statutory redemption right often hinders the foreclosure sale and depresses the price.").
36 C. Williams & R. Heins, Risk Management and Insurance 246 (6th ed. 1989).
37 See D. Bickelhaupt, General Insurance 69-70 (11th ed. 1983) (emphasizing that "actual
results tend to equal expected (probable) results as the number of independent events
increases"); E. Vaughan & C. Elliot, Fundamentals of Risk and Insurance 18 (2d ed. 1978)
("In addition to eliminating risk at the level of the individual through transfer, the insurance
mechanism reduces risk... for the economy as a whole."). One commentator has written:
Applied to insurance, the law of large numbers means that as one increases the number
of insured persons possessing independent and identically-valued risks, one increases the
accuracy of prediction of expected loss for each individual.... [I]ncreasing predictive
accuracy reduces the effective risk faced by the insurer, since the level of aggregate risk
is a function of the variance of expected outcomes.
Priest, The Current Insurance Crisis and Modem Tort Law, 96 Yale L.J. 1521, 1540 (1987).
38 R. Cooter & T. Ulen, Law and Economics 58-60 (1988).
[Vol. 77:489
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low utility premiums, in turn, are paid out as high marginal utility
dollars to individuals who have suffered events entitling them to a
recovery. 9 In this way, insurance can maximize the marginal utility
of capital among people and across time periods.40
In addition, insurance can promote economic efficiency by affecting
the incentives to engage in productive activities and by stimulating
loss prevention activities. In the absence of insurance, a risk averse
individual might avoid high risk activities with positive expected val-
ues, preferring instead safer, yet potentially less productive, invest-
ments.41 By enabling the investor to minimize her risk, insurance
increases the likelihood that she will invest in activities with the high-
est expected values.42 Shifting the risk of loss from individuals to
firms may also increase loss prevention efforts. The cost of collecting
data or devising loss minimization strategies will often exceed the ben-
efits for any one individual. Insurance providers, however, face the
aggregation of many individual losses and thus receive a large benefit
from loss prevention investments, the cost of which may then be
spread throughout the insured population.43
39 D. Bickelhaupt, supra note 37, at 86.
40 Some lawyers and economists suggest that insurance promotes economic efficiency by
helping individuals equalize their marginal utility of money in different states of the world.
Assuming that most people experience a declining marginal utility of money, a person facing
the risk that he will have less money in a future state will maximize total utility by shifting
money from the present to the future state. Insurance permits this shifting of assets when the
change in state is brought about by the occurrence of an insured risk. See Priest, supra note
37, at 1539; Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical Synthesis, 97
Yale L.J. 353, 362 (1988).
41 Business entities and extremely wealthy individuals may not require insurance to make
efficient investment decisions because they can frequently diversify their own assets or self-
insure. See infra text accompanying notes 147-48.
42 Cf. Kaplow, An Economic Analysis of Legal Transitions, 99 Harv. L. Rev. 509, 527-28
(1986) (stating that insurance mitigates the risk of investments); Schill, Intergovermnental
Takings and Just Compensation: A Question of Federalism, 137 U. Pa. L. Rev. 829, 851-52
(1989) (stating that compensation may be a form of insurance used to promote efficient levels
of investment). Insurance may provide incentives to engage in inefficient conduct as well,
however. See infra texts accompanying notes 149 and 158-59 (discussing the risk of a moral
hazard).
43 Examples of loss prevention activities include investigations of fraudulent claims,
research into the causes of loss generating events, and the development of standards to prevent
losses. See M. Greene & J. Trieschmann, Risk and Insurance 30 (6th ed. 1984).
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Viewed from an ex ante perspective, mortgagor protection laws
may serve an insurance function.' Many of the causes of mortgage
default, such as unemployment and falling house values,45 are beyond
the control of individual borrowers. Mortgagors, especially those
who live in states with volatile economies, may place a high value on
mortgagor protections, such as an entitlement to be free from per-
sonal liability,4 6 the ability to remain in possession of the property
during the foreclosure and redemption periods, or the ability to repur-
chase their homes within a certain period after the foreclosure sale.
Mortgagor protection laws may also promote economic efficiency by
minimizing the risk of homebuying, leading to higher levels of indi-
vidual well-being and a more optimal level of housing consumption.
II. AN EMPIRICAL EXAMINATION OF THE COST OF MORTGAGOR
PROTECTION LAWS
In Part I, I propose that mortgagor protection laws might promote
economic efficiency as a form of insurance against the adverse effects
44Other debtor protections such as the bankruptcy discharge have also been compared to
insurance. See Sullivan, Warren & Westbrook, Limiting Access to Bankruptcy Discharge: An
Analysis of the Creditors' Data, 1983 Wis. L. Rev. 1091, 1142 (stating that bankruptcy
discharge serves an insurance function for the debtor). In fact, mortgagor protections may fill
a gap in the insurance function provided by bankruptcy law: bankruptcy law frequently
exempts a portion of the value of a debtor's home from the claims of unsecured creditors, but
leaves the home unprotected from the claims of a secured lender such as a mortgagee. See T.
Sullivan, E. Warren & J. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 142-43 (observing that lack of
homeowner protection from mortgagees may be "surprising").
45 See infra text accompanying note 76.
46 Prohibitions on deficiency judgments with respect to personal property secured finance
transactions have been justified on the ground that creditors would otherwise fail to maximize
the resale value of the collateral; if creditors can reach the assets of debtors in addition to
repossessing collateral, the creditors may not have sufficient incentives to maximize the sales
price of the collateral. As Schwartz shows in a recent article, however, this rationale for anti-
deficiency judgment legislation is seldom justified. Because creditors face the risk that
borrowers will have insufficient assets to cover deficiency judgments, creditors should, in most
circumstances, maximize their recovery by selling the collateral for the highest possible price.
Schwartz, The Enforceability of Security Interests in Consumer Goods, 26 J.L. & Econ. 117,
125-29 (1983). The conclusion that borrowers will maximize sale prices is particularly true in
the context of real property mortgage markets. As discussed supra text accompanying notes 6-
9, the process of mortgage foreclosure is heavily regulated by state law. In states that require
judicial foreclosure, the sale of the mortgaged property is not influenced by the mortgagee,
except to the extent that the mortgagee is a bidder at the foreclosure sale. Even in states that
permit foreclosure by power of sale, typically sheriffs or trustees conduct the sale for the
express purpose of limiting conflicts of interest that might arise out of the mortgagee's
participation. See supra note 9.
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of default and foreclosure.47 In this Part, I examine the costs gener-
ated by mortgagor protection laws. Although a full cost/benefit anal-
ysis of mortgagor protection laws would examine benefits as well as
costs, unfortunately no data exist to shed light on how much people
would offer to pay for protection. Nevertheless, if the costs of mort-
gagor protection laws are as high as lawyers and economists have
argued, it would be questionable whether the benefits would ever be
sufficient to make these laws efficient. Should the cost of laws such as
statutory rights of redemption and deficiency judgment prohibitions
be small, however, the likelihood that they would promote, rather
than detract from, the objective of economic efficiency would substan-
tially increase.
A. Net Present Value Simulation Model
One method of estimating the magnitude of costs generated by
mortgagor protection laws is to create and to test a model of expected
returns to lenders. In this Subpart I construct a net present value48
model of lender return in which the only risk a lender faces is the risk
of borrower default. The model assumes that a lender extends a self-
amortizing loan to the borrower. As is typical with home mortgage
loans, the borrower may prepay the loan at any time with no penalty.
In the event that a borrower defaults on his mortgage loan, the lender
will foreclose the mortgage lien and, if possible, pursue a deficiency
judgment against the borrower. Let:
V = the initial principal balance of the loan;
Tm = the term of the loan;
T . the year in which the loan is prepaid;
I, =the principal balance of the loan in any year t;
C - the net cost to the lender of originating the loan;
Ct the annual cost to the lender of servicing the loan;49
r the lender's cost of funds;
47 Laws mandating mortgagor protections would be efficient only if the private market
failed to generate an optimal level of protection. In Part III, I examine why private markets
may fail to provide an efficient level of mortgagor protection.
48 Net present value is equal to the sum of all positive and negative projected cash flows
associated with an investment, discounted to present value. See S. Maisel, Real Estate Finance
452 (1987).
49 C1 is assumed to increase each year by a set inflation rate 'iT'. C = C, (I + ir).
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M = the annual lump sum payment by the borrower to the
lender;5"
d, = the probability that the borrower will default in any year t;
Rt = the revenue received by the lender from the foreclosure
sale and deficiency judgment;51
h = the time between the borrower's last payment and the date
the lender receives Rt; and
F, = the cost to the lender of foreclosing the mortgage and
bringing a deficiency judgment action. 2
The net present value of a mortgage may be obtained by adding
together each of the cash flows to the lender described below:
(1) - V - Co, constituting the disbursement by the lender of the
loan principal and the cost of origination;
t
T (M -CQ(1 -E d)
E S-1
(2) t1 (l+r) ,representing the discounted value of the regu-
larly scheduled payments received by the lender for the years that
the borrower remains in good standing;
T-1 LT(1- E dt)( )(3) t1 (+r)T , representing the discounted value of all loan
prepayments received by the lender; and
M- iV
1-S (I+i)T
, where i is the annual interest rate charged by the lender to the borrower.
The net present value model assumes annual lump sum mortgage loan payments rather than
monthly payments. The mathematical results are similar to those that would be obtained by
using a monthly payment convention.
51 R, = 0 (L,), where 0 is the proportion of the loan balance recovered by the lender by
virtue of the foreclosure sale and deficiency judgment.
52 F, is assumed to increase each year by a set inflation rate 'ir'. F, = F, (I + iry.
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T_1 d t( h)F
E (1+r)h
(4) t-1 (1+r)t , being equal to the discounted value of all net
revenue received by the lender from the foreclosure sale and defi-
ciency judgment.
In sum:
NPV -- C0  T (M-C)(1-E d,) E 1 ) LT ) + T-1 dt( )-FNPV= -V-C o + E S-1- + (1-t-1 dr) ( (r) E1+
t-1 (1+rYt  t-1 Ul+r) t
In the analysis that follows, I assume that the net present value of a
loan will equal zero.53 Several variables are held constant throughout
the analysis:
V = $80,00014  di= 0.09%51
Tm = 30 years d2 = 0.64%
T = 9 years56  d3 = 0.97%
53 This is consistent with an assumption of competitive markets.
54 This value of V is based upon a purchase price of $100,000 and a loan-to-value ratio of
80%.
55 Values for default probabilities were obtained by adjusting a conventional loan default
curve to reflect current default rates. See Peters, Pinkus & Askin, Prepayment Patterns of
Conventional Mortgages: Experience from the Freddie Mac Portfolio, 1 Secondary Mortgage
Markets 6, 10 (1984) (displaying conditional rates of default for loans in the Federal Home
Loan Mortgage Corporation portfolio). In order to present a "worst possible case" scenario, I
have chosen to err on the side of using default rates that are in excess of actual default rates.
56 Relatively few loans are held to maturity because borrowers prepay them to move
elsewhere, obtain a lower interest rate, or default. Because prepayments are closely tied to
changes in interest rates, computing an average life for mortgage loans is an extremely
complex procedure. See Becketti, The Prepayment Risk of Mortgage-Backed Securities, Fed.
Reserve Bank of Kan. City Econ. Rev., Feb. 1989, at 43, 48-55; Hu, Prepayment Projections,
48 Mortgage Banking 55 (1987). Estimates of an average mortgage life range from seven to
twelve years. See E. Baldwin & S. Stotts, Mortgage-Backed Securities: A Reference Guide for
Lenders and Issuers 285 (1990) (FHA experience shows an average life of 12 years); Interview
with Lyle Gramley & Richard Peach, Senior Staff Vice President and Chief Economist & Staff
Vice President, respectively, of Mortgage Bankers Association, in Washington, D.C. (July 17,
1990) (average life of seven years for conventional mortgages).
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C = $1,2507 d = 1.35%
Q = $9058 d5 = 1.20%
r = 10% d6 = 0.58%
1? = 5% d7 = 0.11%
d8 = 0.05%
Mortgagor protection laws are assumed to affect only three
variables in the net present value simulation model. Statutory rights
of redemption are likely to increase the time (h) between the last
payment received by the lender and the date the lender ultimately
receives the proceeds from the foreclosure sale.59 Statutory rights of
redemption might also increase foreclosure costs (Ft) if the lender
purchases the property and the borrower later redeems. Finally, the
proportion of the loan balance ultimately recovered by the lender (0)
may be reduced by mortgagor protection laws: statutory rights of
redemption may chill bidding at the foreclosure sale, and anti-
deficiency judgment laws may reduce or eliminate money judgments
against the borrower.60
57 See Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., The Cost Study 34 (1988) (average net loan
production income/loss entry).
58 See id. at 46 (total direct servicing expenses entry).
59 This would occur if the lender were to purchase the property at the foreclosure sale and
hold it until the redemption period expired. In this way, the lender might be able to minimize
the discounting due to uncertainty and thus maximize the sales price. Such a strategy, of
course, would have to be balanced against the costs of holding the property, which may be
substantial, e.g., interest, vandalism, and depreciation.
60 It is conceivable that mortgagor protection laws might also increase default rates.
Mortgagor protection laws might raise the cost of credit, thereby making it harder for
borrowers to afford their monthly payments. In addition, mortgagor protections might induce
moral hazard, leading borrowers to be less diligent in making their payments. It is unlikely,
however, that mortgagor protections would increase the default rate. As my empirical analysis
in the next section indicates, the increased cost of credit attributable to mortgagor protections
is likely to be quite small. See infra text accompanying note 84. In addition, as I discuss in
Part IV, problems of moral hazard are likely to be quite limited in the context of mortgage
default and foreclosure. See infra text accompanying notes 158-59. Recent empirical data
support the conclusion that the existence of mortgagor protection laws does not increase
foreclosure rates. See Clauretie, The Impact of Interstate Foreclosure Cost Differences and the
Value of Mortgages on Default Rates, 15 Am. Real Est. & Urb. Econ. A.L 152, 164 (1987)
(stating that statutory rights of redemption are negatively related to foreclosure rates; the
existence of deficiency judgment prohibitions is not significantly related to foreclosure rates).
Similarly, when I replace the interest rate variable with delinquency rates in the regression
model contained in the next Subpart, see infra text accompanying notes 65-84, I find that
mortgagor protection laws are negatively related to delinquency rates.
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To examine the costs generated by changes in the variables serving
as proxies for the effects of mortgagor protection laws, I estimate a
base case that assumes that these laws do not exist. The respective
values of h, F1, and 0 in the base case are 3 months, $275, and 98%.61
The interest rate that must be charged by a lender to break even under
the base case is 10.52%.
Table I shows the break-even interest rates and the annual debt
service payments that result from varying the values of h, Ft, and 0.
The results indicate that holding h and F, constant, and decreasing
the proportion of the loan balance recovered by a mortgagee from
98% to 88% and 78%, would increase the break-even interest rate by
five and twelve basis points, respectively. In other words, for a lender
to break even, borrowers would have to pay an additional $43 to $86
per year in debt service payments. If the effect of the laws was to
decrease the proportion of the debt recovered to 78%, increase legal
costs from $275 to $3,000, and lengthen the foreclosure process by a
year, the break-even interest rate would climb by eighteen basis
points. Annual debt service payments would increase by only $134,
or $11.17 per month, in this particularly gloomy scenario.
61 Estimates of h and F, are based on figures reported for Texas. See D. Jankowski, The
National Mortgage Servicer's Reference Directory 1-6 to 1-7 (6th ed. 1989) (tables listing
optimum foreclosure time frames and fees allowed by the Federal National Mortgage
Association). The estimate that lenders recover 98% of the loan balance at foreclosure is
consistent with recent empirical evidence. See Fed. Home Loan Bank Board, Invited Working
Paper No. 30, The Costs of Mortgage Loan Foreclosure: Case Studies of Six Savings & Loan
Associations 7 (1980) (study commissioned by Federal Home Loan Bank Board reporting that
in three states with varying levels of mortgagor protection laws, the foreclosure sales price
exceeds the loan balance by amounts ranging from $72 to $250 per $1,000 loan balance);
Mortgage Bankers Ass'n of Am., News Release, Lenders Lose on Mortgage Foreclosures,
Survey Shows (Dec. 19, 1984) (stating that the average loss on conventional mortgage loan
foreclosure is $400 to $1,000 based upon a principal balance of $41,716); cf. T. Sullivan, E.
Warren & J. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 309 (reporting that a survey of bankruptcies filed in
1981 shows that debt extended by savings and loans and private mortgage companies is almost
fully secured).
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TABLE I: NET PRESENT VALUE SIMULATION RESULTS
Time to Break-even Annual
Foreclosure Complete Interest Debt
Costs Foreclosure Rate Service
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The net present value simulation indicates that holding all other
factors constant, mortgagor protections that increase the time to
complete the foreclosure process, increase the cost of foreclosure, and
decrease the amount recovered by a lender in the event of a default
have a rather small effect on the interest rate required by a lender, at
least as compared to the effects reported in the studies summarized in
Part I. The relative infrequency of default explains, at least in part,
the relative insensitivity of interest rates to changes in legal variables.
Mortgagor protections generate actual costs only when a borrower
defaults on his loan and the lender forecloses; if mortgagors rarely
default, then the expected costs will be small. Despite regional
variations, default and foreclosure rates for conventional home
mortgage loans in the United States are relatively low.62
B. Multiple Regression Analysis
Multiple regression analysis reinforces the results of the net present
value simulation. If mortgagor protection laws generate substantial
costs, economic theory suggests that lenders in a competitive market
will pass these costs along to borrowers. 63 Empirical studies of mort-
gage markets consistently show that interest rates for home mortgage
loans vary across states and regions.64 To the extent that mortgagor
62 As of the fourth quarter of 1989, less than 1% of all conventional home loan mortgagors
were over two months late in making debt payments and only one-half of one percent of all
conventional mortgages were in foreclosure. During the fourth quarter, fewer than .2% of one
percent of conventional home loan mortgages went into foreclosure. See Mortgage Bankers
Ass'n of Am., National Delinquency Survey (Feb. 22, 1990) (Traditional table for
Conventional Loans). Default and foreclosure rates for loans insured by the Federal Housing
Administration were much higher. See id. (Traditional table for all FHA Loans) (reporting
that 2.4% of all FHA loans were in arrears by 60 days or more; .39% went into foreclosure
during the fourth quarter of 1989).
63 The ability of lenders to pass along costs to borrowers assumes that the demand for
mortgage loans is not perfectly elastic. If lenders were unable to pass the costs along to
borrowers for any reason such as interest rate ceilings, they might instead ration credit or
require increased downpayments. During the time period under study, there is no reason to
believe that lenders faced any impediment to passing the costs of mortgagor protections, if any,
to borrowers. See infra note 65 (discussing federal preemption of state interest rate ceiling
laws).
64 L. Grebler, D. Blank & L. Winnick, Capital Formation in Residential Real Estate:
Trends and Prospects 221, 229-30 (1956); Fredrikson, The Geographic Structure of
Residential Mortgage Yields, in 2 Essays on Interest Rates 187, 195-96 (J. Guttentag ed.
1971); Longbrake & Peterson, Regional and Intra-Regional Variations in Mortgage Loan
Rates, 31 J. Econ. & Bus. 75, 80-81 (1979); Ostas, Regional Differences in Mortgage Financing
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protection laws generate substantial costs, one would hypothesize that
at least a portion of the interstate variation in home mortgage loan
interest rates is attributable to the existence of these laws.
In this Subpart I test the hypothesis that state mortgagor protection
laws are causally related to increased interest rates for home mortgage
loans. I begin by specifying a reduced form model of the determi-
nants of state interest rates. The rate of interest charged by lenders
for mortgage loans is determined by a combination of forces within
state, regional, and national economies. Conditions within a state
that increase the risk of mortgage default should be positively related
to higher interest rates. Similarly, laws that increase the expected cost
of mortgage default should also be positively related to increased
interest rates.65
Costs: A Reexamination, 32 J. Fin. 1774, 1778 (1977); Schaaf, Regional Differences in
Mortgage Financing Costs, 21 J. Fin. 85, 93 (1966).
65 Unlike some empirical studies, my model of state mortgage loan interest rates does not
include a variable for lenders' cost of funds. See, e.g., A. Jaffe, supra note 31, at 18-19;
Longbrake & Peterson, supra note 64, at 76; Zabrenski, Barth & Marlow, Determinants of
Regional Mortgage Rates Under Varying Economic Conditions, 22 Q. Rev. Econ. & Bus. 81,
88 (1982). These studies examined the determinants of state mortgage loan interest rates prior
to the integration of mortgage markets with general credit markets. See Schill, supra note 2.
Even when mortgage markets were segmented, this variable had little explanatory power. See
A. Jaffe, supra note 31, at 18. With integration, mortgage originators are no longer reliant
upon local sources of funds. Instead, they may import unlimited funds from other areas by
selling mortgages in the secondary mortgage market.
My model also does not explicitly include variables for loan-to-value ratios and term-to-
maturity, which are sometimes used in other studies. See, e.g., id. at 13; Meador, supra note
27, at 146; Ostas, supra note 64, at 1775; Zabrenski, Barth & Marlow, supra, at 87. These
variables are already controlled for by virtue of the nature of the dependent variable. See infra
note 68.
Finally, some studies have examined the effect of interest rate ceilings on state interest rates.
I do not include this variable for two reasons. First, in 1980 Congress preempted state interest
rate ceilings on most single family home loan mortgages. See Depository Institutions
Deregulation and Monetary Control Act of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-221, § 501(a)(1), 94 Stat.
132, 161 (codified at 12 U.S.C. § 1735f-7a (1988)). Although Congress permitted states to
reinstate their laws prior to 1983, only 15 chose to do so. See Schill, supra note 2. Second, it is
unlikely that usury ceilings would have affected interest rates even in the 15 states that
reenacted their laws. During the time period under study, mortgage loan interest rates were
modest and credit plentiful. See Lea, Sources of Funds for Mortgage Finance, I J. Housing
Res. 139, 158 (1990) (observing that by the mid to late 1980s, "mortgage credit became readily
available to borrowers at market-determined prices"); Roth, Volatile Mortgage Rates-A New
Fact of Life?, Fed. Reserve Bank of Kan. City Econ. Rev., Mar. 1988, at 16-17 (graph showing
decline of interest rates in late 1980s from their high levels at the beginning of the decade).
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The dependent variable used in the multiple regression analysis is
the average state effective interest rate6 6 for 90% loan-to-value, con-
ventiona 67 mortgage loans secured by newly constructed homes.68
Quarterly observations from each state are used for the period of June
1987 to December 1989. The state risk variables included in the
model are: per capita household income (INCOME),69 the unemploy-
ment rate (UNEMP),7 ° the proportion of the state's population
employed in agriculture (AGRPCT), 71 the standard deviation of con-
ventional mortgage delinquency rates for the period 1986-1989
66 The effective interest rate of a mortgage loan is calculated by summing the contract rate
and the initial fees and charges assessed by lenders, all amortized over a 10 year period.
67 A conventional mortgage loan is one that is not insured by the federal government. For
purposes of this study, a conventional loan will also bear a fixed interest rate.
68 The source of the state interest rate data is the monthly survey of home mortgage loan
originators conducted by the Federal Home Loan Bank Board (FHLBB). Under the Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, sec. 512,
§ 21, 103 Stat. 183, 406 (to amend 12 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988)), responsibility for conducting the
survey has shifted to the newly constituted Federal Home Finance Agency. The FHLBB
conducted two interest rate surveys each month-one of the commitment rates offered by
lenders, the other of the rates of loans actually closed by lenders. Several empirical studies
have used data from the loans-closed survey. See, e.g., Meador, supra note 27, at 145;
Zabrenski, Barth & Marlow, supra note 65, at 86. In this study, I utilize the FHLBB loan
commitment survey. The loan commitment survey collects interest rate data on loans with
maturities of over 15 years for various loan-to-value ratios. See Zabrenski, New Measures of
Mortgage Rates and Lending Policies, Fed. Home Loan Bank Board J., June 1978, at 14. I
chose to use the loan commitment data rather than the loans-closed data because it permitted
better control over loan-to-value ratios. The dependent variable used in the multiple
regression analysis is the effective interest rate for loans with 90% loan-to-value ratios. This
rate was selected because of the likelihood that if state mortgagor protection laws increased
expected costs, the effect would be greatest for loans with the highest degree of risk, and high
loan-to-value ratios are frequently found to increase the risk of default. See Jackson &
Kaserman, Default Risk on Home Mortgage Loans: A Test of Competing Hypotheses, 47 J.
Risk & Ins. 678, 683-84 (1980); Waller, Residential Mortgage Default: An Empirical Note on
Changes in Property Value and Debt over Time, 8 Housing Fin. Rev. 155, 162 (1989). Data
from the loan commitment survey confirms that lenders charge higher interest rates for loans
with 90% loan-to-value ratios than for loans with 75% loan-to-value ratios.
69 Data for several of the variables used in the regression analysis was obtained from
computerized data files maintained by the WEFA Group ("WEFA") (located at 401 City
Avenue, Suite 300, Bala Cynwyd, Pennsylvania 19004). INCOME is contained in WEFA's
RMAC data base and is based on United States Bureau of the Census Current Population
Reports.
70 WEFA, supra note 69, RMAC data base, based upon data from the Bureau of Labor
Statistics.
71 Id.
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(DELINQSD), 72 and the change in conventional mortgage foreclo-
sure rates over the preceding four quarters (CH4FCIC). 73 To test the
effect of state mortgagor protection laws on the dependent variable,
two independent variables are included in the model. The existence of
a state law prohibiting a mortgagee from obtaining a deficiency judg-
ment when it uses the predominant method of foreclosure is repre-
sented by the dummy variable NDEFJUD. 74 A second variable,
REDDAYS, represents the length, in days, of any statutory redemp-
tion period applicable to the predominant means of mortgage
foreclosure.75
A positive relationship is expected between the risk variables
UNEMP, AGRPCT, DELINQSD, CH4FCIC, and state mortgage
loan interest rates. Lenders price mortgage loans based on their cur-
rent estimation of future risks. These projections are based, in part,
on current conditions and historical trends. High unemployment
rates, for instance, have been shown to be significantly related to
mortgage default.76 Therefore, one would expect high unemployment
rates to be positively related to higher interest rates. There should
also be a positive correlation between high levels of agricultural
72 WEFA, supra note 69, REMP data base, based upon data from the Mortgage Bankers
Association.
73 Id.
74 NDEFJUD takes on a value of one if the state prohibits a mortgagee using the state's
predominant method of foreclosure from suing the borrower for a deficiency judgment.
Otherwise, the variable takes on a value of zero.
75 If a state has no statutory right of redemption, the value of REDDAYS is zero. Included
in the REDDAYS variable are time periods that are not technically post-foreclosure statutory
rights of redemption, but that the state mandates to accomplish similar purposes. A small
number of states establish periods of time either before the foreclosure sale takes place or after
the foreclosure sale, but before judicial confirmation of the sale, during which a mortgagor can
redeem his property. These redemption periods are additions to the mortgagor's equitable
redemption rights. See, e.g., Ind. Code § 32-8-16-1 (1979 & Supp. 1990) (90 day automatic
stay of foreclosure sale); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2329.33 (Anderson 1981 & Supp. 1989)
(debtor can redeem after sale and before court confirmation); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 846.10 (West
1977 & Supp. 1990) (12 month redemption period before sale).
76 See Campbell & Dietrich, The Determinants of Default on Insured Conventional
Residential Mortgage Loans, 38 J. Fin. 1569, 1578 (1983); Sullivan & Rogers, Residential
Mortgage Delinquencies and Foreclosures: Improvement's Underway, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Atlanta Econ. Rev., Dec. 1983, at 34, 36; T. Holloway & R. Rosenblatt, Problem Loans:
Trends, Causes, and Outlook for the Future 25 (Apr. 1990) (unpublished manuscript); cf. T.
Sullivan, E. Warren & J. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 98-102 (reporting that a majority of
wage-earning households filing for bankruptcy had experienced an interruption in income and
a decline in earnings prior to bankruptcy).
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employment and increased risk in mortgage lending. Farm economies
are frequently subjected to jolts attributable to volatile food prices and
climatic conditions, which in turn lead to high levels of foreclosure
and economic distress.77 In addition, one would expect volatile rates
of mortgage delinquencies and foreclosures to increase the risk of
mortgage lending and, therefore, to be positively related to higher
interest rates. With respect to INCOME, the relationship between
income and interest rates is difficult to predict. On the one hand,
higher levels of household income might increase the ability of mort-
gagors to pay their debts, thereby reducing the risk of default and the
interest rate charged for loans. On the other hand, higher levels of
income probably lead households to purchase more expensive homes,
perhaps resulting in credit overextension and a heightened risk of
default. Furthermore, if household income in a particular state
increases disproportionately as compared to other states, more home
loan mortgage credit would likely flow to that state. The increased
flow of mortgage credit to particular states may lead to less overall
diversification in the mortgage market, thereby increasing levels of
risk. Lenders might compensate for this increased risk by charging
higher interest rates in states with higher demand. Therefore, it is
impossible to predict, ex ante, the expected relationship between
household income and interest rates.
Home mortgage loan interest rates are determined by a combina-
tion of state, regional, and national variables. Not all of these forces
are measured by the five risk and two state law variables in the regres-
sion model. To capture the effect of macroeconomic factors on state
interest rates, I include in the model ten time-dependent dummy vari-
ables ("DTIME02, DTIME03, . . . DTIMEl l"). 71 In addition, I
include eight regional dummy variables ("DREG2, DREG3, . . .
DREG9") that serve as a flexible control for unmeasured, sub-
national economic forces.79
77 See, e.g., Despair, Violence Down on the Farm, U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 17, 1983,
at 13 (discussing wave of foreclosures in farm states); Winter of Despair Hits the Farm Belt,
U.S. News & World Rep., Jan. 20, 1986, at 21 (same).
78 Estimated coefficients in the multiple regression model are robust in the sense that
including a long-term bond rate in place of the time period dummy variables does not change
their sign or significantly affect their magnitude.
79 A more completely specified panel model would include a dummy variable for each state
to control for unmeasurable state-specific effects. Unfortunately, I cannot include individual
1991]
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Table II contains the results of the multiple regression analysis.
The second column presents parameters estimated by ordinary least
squares. 0 All of the risk and legal variables except for household
income are significantly different from zero at the 90% or 95% confi-
dence levels. All of the coefficients, except the one representing the
proportion of the state's population employed in agriculture, have the
expected positive sign."' With respect to the legal variables, a law
prohibiting deficiency judgments is estimated to increase home mort-
gage loan interest rates by 6.7 basis points. Statutory rights of
redemption are estimated to add .02 basis points per day, or 6.5 basis
points for an average redemption period of eleven months.
The multiple regression analysis uses pooled time series and cross
section data to estimate the effect of state law variables on home mort-
gage loan interest rates. Using time series data to estimate parameters
according to the ordinary least squares model, however, frequently
generates biased significance tests because of the problem of serial cor-
relation in the error term.82 To correct for first-order serial correla-
tion, I transformed the data using the two-step Cochrane-Orcutt
method. 83 The respecified coefficients are presented in the third col-
umn of Table II.
As expected, the standard errors for the corrected multiple regres-
sion coefficients are larger than they were in the ordinary least squares
model, resulting in diminished levels of statistical significance. The
coefficient for the anti-deficiency judgment law dummy variable is
even smaller than it was using ordinary least squares, although one
can no longer say with 90% confidence that it is different from zero.
The coefficient for statutory rights of redemption, however, remains
statistically significant at the 90% level. A one day statutory redemp-
state dummy variables because the legal variables are time invariant and would therefore be
perfectly co-linear with such a set of variables.
80 See J. Johnston, Econometric Methods 123-32 (2d ed. 1972).
81 One possible explanation for the negative sign of AGRPCT is the recovery, after several
years of distress, experienced by the agricultural sector during the time period under study.
See Robbins, New Decade Finds New Hope on Farm, N.Y. Times, May 18, 1990, § A, at 1,
col. 2 (discussing agricultural recovery beginning in 1987).
82 Serial correlation occurs when the value of a variable at time t is correlated with its value
at time t-l. If such a relationship among the prediction errors exists, one of the assumptions of
the ordinary least squares model-that residual errors are random-is violated. Serial
correlation commonly results in underestimated standard errors and therefore inflated t
statistics. See J. Johnston, supra note 80, at 122.
83 See J. Kmenta, Elements of Econometrics 314-16 (2d ed. 1986).
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TABLE II: MULTIPLE REGRESSION ANALYSIS
Independent OIS Transformed
Variable Model OS Model
Intercept 10.86775 b  10.86719b
(0.15138) (0.21621)
UNEMP 0.01895b  0.01924b
(0.00975) (0.01138)
























DREG8 -0.17550 b  -0.19 3 24 b(0.05242) (0.07790)
DREG9 -0.06430 -0.07298
(0.07835) (0.11747)




DTIMEO4 -0.74090 b  -0.74477 b
(0.04646) (0.03384)
DTIMEO5 0.54657 b  0.54637 b
(0.04612) (0.03342)
DTIMEO6 -0.12800 b  0.12668b
(0.04615) (0.03347)
DTIMEO7 -0.07113 -0.07142 b
(0.04604) (0.03331)
DTIMEO8 0.40907b  0.41119 b
(0.04628) (0.03366)
DTIMEO9 -0.43261 b  -0.43389b
(0.04603) (0.03323)
DTIME10 -0.30080 b  -0.30115 b
(0.04622) (0.03359)
DTIME11 -0.32386 b  -0.32404 b
(0.04597) (0.03308)
Observations 462 462
IR2  0.698 N/A
Durbin-Watson 1.146 N/A
Note - Standard Errors are reported in parentheses. One-tailed significance tests are used for
UNEMP, DELINQSD, CH4FCIC, AGRPCT, NDEFJUD, REDDAYS.
I Estimated coefficient is significant at 90% level.
b Estimated coefficient is significant at 95% level.
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tion period is estimated to add .022 basis points to a home mortgage
loan, or 7.3 basis points for a typical eleven month redemption period.
The results of multiple regression analysis reinforce the conclusions
drawn from the net present value simulation, which suggest that the
results of earlier empirical studies are exaggerated. Mortgagor pro-
tection laws may lead to higher home loan mortgage rates, but the
magnitude of the increase in credit costs is likely to be modest.
Whereas Meador's results indicate that an eleven month statutory
redemption period would increase new home loan rates by 17.42 basis
points, my results indicate that the rise in interest rates would be less
than half that size. Similarly, Meador found the existence of a law
prohibiting deficiency judgments to contribute 13.87 basis points to a
loan's interest rate; I fail to find the effect of such a law on interest
rates to be statistically significant. 84
84 A failure to find that anti-deficiency laws are a statistically significant cause of increased
interest rates does not, however, rule out the possibility that their effect on interest rates might
be large. Given the relatively large standard error of the NDEFJUD variable, I am unable to
reject Meador's estimate with a 95% level of confidence. Nevertheless, the net present value
simulation analysis suggests that the magnitude of the effect is smaller than the effect estimated
by Meador.
Several possible explanations exist to account for the difference in the results obtained in this
Article and those estimated by Meador. First, Meador examined interest rate data from 1973
to 1976, whereas I have used data from 1987 to 1989. Over the past ten years, mortgage
markets have been transformed by the secondary mortgage market. Most home mortgage
loans originated are now sold in the secondary market, and these secondary mortgage market
agencies generally do not fully price the expected costs that are attributable to state mortgagor
protection laws. See Schill, supra note 2. Therefore, the full costs of mortgagor protection
laws might not be reflected in state interest rates and instead might be externalized to citizens
of other states. Such externalization would lead me to underestimate the magnitude of the
costs. Second, Meador utilized a somewhat different model and a different source of data for
home loan interest rates. Third, instead of using state interest rates, Meador used interest rates
for Standard Metropolitan Statistical Areas (SMSAs) as his dependent variable. This
specification of his dependent variable may have biased his results, since several SMSAs span
more than one state. Fourth, Meador used time series data, yet apparently failed to investigate
and correct for serial correlation. This failure to adjust for serial correlation may have led to
biased significance tests. Finally, a large proportion of borrowers who receive loans with loan-
to-value ratios over 80% are required to purchase private mortgage insurance. Private
mortgage insurance reduces the risk to the lender of mortgage default. To examine whether
private mortgage insurance might bias my results, I ran the regression model with a different
dependent variable-interest rates for loans with loan-to-value ratios of 75%. Because these
loans typically are not covered by private mortgage insurance, one would expect to find the
coefficients for the legal variables significantly higher than those reported for 90% loan-to-
value loans if such a bias existed. The results of this regression show that the size of the
estimated coefficient for NDEFJUD was slightly greater than the estimate reported for 90%
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Given the small magnitude of costs associated with these laws, at
least relative to the estimates of most lawyers and economists, it is
plausible that mortgagor protection laws promote the objective of eco-
nomic efficiency by functioning as a form of insurance against the
adverse effects of mortgage default and foreclosure. The remainder of
this Article addresses whether government intervention in mortgage
markets is necessary to generate an optimal supply of mortgagor pro-
tections and, if so, how that intervention should be structured.
III. MORTGAGOR PROTECTIONS AND PRIVATE MARKETS
In Parts I and II of this Article, I suggest that when viewed as a
form of insurance, mortgagor protections might promote, rather than
detract from, the objective of economic efficiency. Borrowers might
be better off paying a modest amount in higher debt service costs in
return for protection against the adverse effects of default and foreclo-
sure. Even if these protections do promote economic efficiency, gov-
ernment intervention, in the form of mandating mortgagor
protections, would be justified only if: (1) a market failure exists; (2)
the market failure generates contract terms that do not include effi-
cient mortgagor protections; and (3) government intervention could
correct the market failure.8 5
In analyzing whether mortgage markets might fail to provide an
efficient level of mortgagor protections, I adopt a simplified model of
mortgagor-mortgagee interaction. I conclude that mortgagees are
likely to offer mortgagors an appropriate level of mortgagor protec-
loan-to-value ratio loans, whereas the estimate for REDDAYS was smaller. Neither estimate,
however, was significantly different from zero at the 90% confidence level.
85 See Scott, Rethinking the Regulation of Coercive Creditor Remedies, 89 Colum. L. Rev.
730, 767 (1989). For the purposes of this analysis, I adopt Scott's norm of expanded choice.
Prohibitions on consensually agreed upon contract terms, including nonwaivable terms such as
mortgagor protection laws, that effectively narrow freedom of contract violate this norm and
therefore require special justification. See id. at 766; see also Goetz & Scott, The Limits of
Expanded Choice: An Analysis of the Interactions Between Express and Implied Contract
Terms, 73 Calif. L. Rev. 261, 266 (1985):
Tiwo key suppositions underlie this notion of Expanded Choice: (1) that state-supplied
terms are mere facilitators, specifying terms that the parties could formulate themselves
if unrestrained by time and effort costs; (2) that the availability of state-supplied terms is
neutral in that it raises no barriers beyond the existing resource costs to the use of
alternative terms by atypical parties.
Cf. Schwartz, supra note 40, at 360 n.12 (whose analysis assumes validity of "methodological
individualism").
1991]
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tions as long as mortgagors accurately estimate the risk of mortgage
default and mortgagees have full information with respect to the like-
lihood of borrower default. As these assumptions are relaxed, a role
for government emerges to ensure that mortgagors obtain an optimal
level of protection against default and foreclosure. In Part IV, I
examine alternative ways in which this government intervention
might be structured.
A. A Model of the Mortgagor-Mortgagee Interaction
To analyze the appropriateness of government intervention in
mortgage markets, I first develop a model of mortgagor-mortgagee
behavior based upon eleven assumptions. Five of these assumptions
remain constant throughout the analysis: (1) the benefits of mortgagor
protections exceed their cost;8 6 (2) a relatively large number of poten-
tial sources for mortgage funds exist in every housing market;8 7 (3)
mortgagees are less averse to risk than mortgagors;88 (4) mortgagees
can offer more than one set of mortgage terms to each customer; and
(5) mortgagors have varying levels of aversion to risk.
86 The assumption that the benefits of mortgagor protections exceed their costs is critical to
this Part. Although I admit that this assumption is unproved, Part II shows that the costs of
mortgagor protections are likely to be quite modest. In the absence of data on how much
consumers value these protections, I conclude in Part II that my results are consistent with the
hypothesis that the benefits of these protections exceed their cost. My objective in this Part of
the Article is to examine whether the private market would be likely to provide these
protections if they were efficient.
87 In recent years, the number of mortgage loan originators has increased dramatically.
Home loan mortgages are currently originated by a large number of institutions including
savings and loan institutions, commercial banks, credit unions, and mortgage banks. In
addition, in recent years geographical lending limits for mortgage originators have been
liberalized. Further, mortgage markets are generally considered to be competitive. See S.
Maisel, supra note 48, at 229 ("Most local markets have sufficient competition so that lenders
cannot make an excessive markup over the secondary market rate."); Lasko, Housing Finance
in the USA in the 1990s, Housing Fin. Int'l, Aug. 1989, at 4, 4 (stating that the mortgage
market is "one of the most efficient and competitive marketplaces in existence").
88 Individual home loan borrowers are much more likely to be risk averse than lending
institutions. Whereas the average individual borrower has little opportunity to diversify risk
because of the comparatively limited nature of his assets, lending institutions are generally able
to reduce risk by diversifying their investments. In addition, as the recent insolvency of a large
proportion of the savings and loan industry demonstrates, managers of these financial
institutions have exhibited substantial risk-loving behavior. See L. White, The Problems of
The FSLIC: A Policy Maker's View 12-13 (June 1989) (unpublished paper prepared for the
Contemporary Policy Issues Session of the Western Economic Association Conference) (copy
on fie with the Virginia Law Review Association) (discussing the factors that encouraged risk-
taking behavior in the savings and loan industry).
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The remaining six assumptions will be sequentially relaxed in the
analysis that follows: (6) the mortgage market operates with zero
transaction costs; (7) all mortgagors shop for price terms; (8) all mort-
gagors shop for mortgagor protection terms; (9) mortgagees cannot
discriminate among mortgagors who shop and those who do not shop;
(10) mortgagees accurately estimate the probability that any particu-
lar mortgagor will default on his loan; and (11) mortgagors accurately
estimate their own risk of mortgage default and foreclosure.
B. Transaction Costs and Shopping
Given the assumptions of the mortgagor-mortgagee interaction
model, mortgagees should offer an infinite variety of mortgagor pro-
tections to potential borrowers. Because borrowers have varying
levels of risk aversion and wealth, they are likely to demand different
amounts of protection. Mortgagees are likely to provide these protec-
tions, charging mortgagors for the marginal costs they generate.
Once the assumption of zero transaction costs is relaxed, however, it
becomes quite unlikely that an infinite variety of mortgagor protec-
tions would be offered. The costs of negotiating and drafting individ-
ualized transactions are apt to dwarf the benefits of the protections.
Instead of customized mortgagor protections, lenders would probably
offer mortgagors a limited menu of standardized choices. 89 Although
standardized choices might be inefficient in a world of zero transac-
tion costs, there is no reason to believe that they would result in a sub-
optimal supply of mortgagor protections once significant transaction
costs are taken into account.
In contrast, relaxing the assumption of universal shopping for price
and nonfinancial terms should not affect the supply of mortgagor pro-
tection terms. As Alan Schwartz and Louis Wilde show in their semi-
nal examination of warranty and security interest markets, loan
markets may be price competitive even though large numbers of con-
89 In effect, this already occurs in mortgage markets with respect to the financial terms
offered by mortgagees. Most lenders offer a menu of loan choices ranging from such old
standards as the 30 year fixed rate mortgage to more esoteric instruments such as the
adjustable rate mortgage, the graduated payment mortgage, and the reverse annuity mortgage.
For a description of alternative mortgage instruments, see Kaufman & Erdevig, Improving
Housing Finance in an Inflationary Environment: Alternative Residential Mortgage
Instruments, in Housing and the New Financial Markets 359 (R. Florida ed. 1986).
1991]
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sumers do not actively shop for price.' As long as a "sufficient"
number of knowledgeable shoppers exist to maintain a competitive
equilibrium and creditors are unable to discriminate among shoppers
and nonshoppers, contract prices are likely to be competitive. In
effect, the shoppers create a "pecuniary externality" for consumers
who either do not shop or fail to comprehend the terms of the
contract. 91
The structure of home mortgage loan markets generally facilitates
price shopping. In many areas, newspapers periodically list mortgage
originators and the rates they offer for a variety of loans. In addition,
most lenders provide rate information over the telephone, and some
even maintain 24-hour mortgage loan rate hotlines. Empirical data
also support the proposition that mortgage markets evidence a sub-
stantial amount of shopping. According to one survey of
homebuyers, over one-third of the respondents indicated that they, or
some outside party acting on their behalf, considered more than one
lender prior to borrowing. 92 Therefore, it seems likely that there are a
sufficient number of shoppers to make home mortgage loan prices
90 Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information in Markets for Contract Terms: The Examples
of Warranties and Security Interests, 69 Va. L. Rev. 1387 (1983) [hereinafter Schwartz &
Wilde, Imperfect Information]; Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets on the Basis of
Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L. Rev. 630 (1979)
[hereinafter Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets].
91 Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 90, at 638.
92 2 Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co., Real Estate Closing Costs: RESPA, Section 14(a), at
XIV.13 (1980) (study commissioned by the U.S. Dep't of Hous. & Urban Dev.); see also D.
Hempel, A Comparative Study of the Home Buying Process in Two Connecticut Housing
Markets 61 (University of Connecticut Center for Real Estate and Urban Economic Studies
Report No. 10, 1970) (reporting that 46% of homebuyers in Hartford contacted more than
two lending institutions; 39% of homebuyers in Southeastern Connecticut consulted more
than two lenders); Colton, Lessard, Modest & Solomon, National Survey of Borrowers'
Housing Characteristics, Attitudes and Preferences in 1 Alternative Mortgage Instruments
Research Study I1-1, 111-85 (1977) (reporting that 54% of respondents to the survey
contacted two or more financial institutions); Dunn & McFall, Sending out the Right Signals,
Mortgage Banking, Dec. 1986, at 21, 22 (reporting that research shows 50% of mortgagors
"shop around" for a mortgage); Hempel & Jain, House Buying Behavior: An Empirical Study
in Cross-Cultural Buyer Behavior, 6 Am. Real Est. & Urb. Econ. A.J. 1, 11 (1978) (reporting
that the mean number of banks contacted to arrange financing ranged from 2.71 to 3.27 in two
Connecticut housing markets). But see Eskridge, One Hundred Years of Ineptitude: The Need
for Mortgage Rules Consonant with the Economic and Psychological Dynamics of the Home
Sale and Loan Transaction, 70 Va. L. Rev. 1083, 1112-14 (1984) (homebuyers do not engage in
sufficient shopping to maximize their housing decisions).
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competitive, even though many homebuyers do not actively shop for
the best interest rate.
In contrast to shopping for price terms, relatively few, if any, mort-
gagors shop for nonfinancial terms such as mortgagor protections.
Though the structure of the home purchase transaction facilitates
price shopping, it impedes shopping for nonfinancial terms. Studies
find that potential homebuyers are frequently under time pressure and
stress.93 Under most sales contracts, the homebuyer is able to bind
the seller for only a short period of time prior to obtaining a mortgage
commitment. 94 In contrast to their competition over price, lenders
make virtually no effort to publicize or make available information
concerning the effects of a mortgagor's default.95 Typically, the first
time that even the most diligent mortgagor becomes aware of the
mortgage terms concerning default and foreclosure is at the closing of
the transaction. At this point, however, the mortgagor is usually bur-
93 See Eskridge, supra note 92, at 1114-18.
94 A typical sales contract for a home contains a mortgage contingency clause that allows a
buyer a period of time, usually one to three months, to obtain a mortgage loan commitment. If
the buyer does not obtain a commitment during this period, the contract may be declared null
and void, and the buyer will be entitled to have his deposit returned. See A. Axelrod, C.
Berger & Q. Johnstone, supra note 17, at 1208 (example of a loan contingency clause in a form
sales contract). During the period specified in the mortgage contingency clause, the
homebuyer must choose a lender, apply for a loan, supply financial documents to the lender,
and have an appraisal of the house completed. In active housing markets, the usual time
period provided by the mortgage contingency clause may be too short to accomplish all of this.
See, e.g., Watterson, Staying atop Mortgage Process Is Crucial, Chr. Sci. Monitor, Sept. 3,
1986, at 19, col. 2 (stating that when lending institutions have a heavy volume, delay in
processing loans may cause the buyer to lose the right to purchase the house); What to Do
Until Mortgage Works Way Through Logjam, Chi. Tribune, July 28, 1986, at C-19, col. 1
(same).
95 Federal law does, however, require mortgagees to make certain disclosures to borrowers.
See Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act of 1974 ("RESPA"), Pub. L. No. 93-533, 88 Stat.
1724 (codified as amended at 12 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2617 (1988)) (requiring standardized
settlement forms); Truth in Lending Act, Pub. L. No. 90-321, 82 Stat. 146 (1968) (codified as
amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1693r (1988)) (requiring disclosure of the amount financed, the
annual percentage rate, and the sum of the finance charges, payments, and the sales price).
The only mention of default or foreclosure is contained in a 44-page booklet prepared by the
United States Department of Housing and Urban Development that RESPA requires lenders
to distribute to borrowers. This densely printed document contains two sentences concerning
default: "If you default on the loan by missing payments altogether... the documents also
specify certain actions which the lender may take to recover the amount owed. Ultimately,
after required notice to you, a default could lead to foreclosure and sale of the home which
secures your loan." U.S. Dep't of Hous. and Urban Dev., Settlement Costs: A HUD Guide 19
(rev. ed. 1983).
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dened with reading and signing a wide variety of unfamiliar docu-
ments.96 Additionally, he will often not be represented by a lawyer
and, therefore, will not fully understand the legal significance of much
of the mortgage form and the underlying law.97 The mortgagor also
has relatively little bargaining power with respect to mortgage terms
once the closing has arrived. He has already paid a nonrefundable
commitment fee to the lender and risks losing his sales deposit to the
seller if the closing is canceled. This combination of factors results in
mortgagors being term takers rather than shoppers with respect to
nonfinancial terms such as those that apply to default and
foreclosure. 9
Even though the vast majority of mortgagors do not shop for mort-
gagor protections and probably have only a hazy understanding of
what would happen to them should they default, there is reason to
believe that inadequate shopping would not lead mortgagees to pro-
vide a sub-optimal set of mortgagor protections. I have assumed for
the purposes of this analysis that the benefits of mortgagor protections
exceed their cost. Given this assumption, even if borrowers do not
shop for these protections, lenders would increase their profits by
offering them.99 Even if lenders were able to discriminate among
96 Among the documents typically distributed or executed at the closing of a transaction are
the deed, the promissory note, the mortgage, the title insurance policy and report, the
mechanic's lien affidavit, and the settlement statement. Cf. Burkins, Just Remember How to
Sign Your Name, Phila. Inquirer, July 8, 1990, at Li, col. 4 (observing that, at settlement,
home buyers must sign "mountains of documents").
97 Cf. Colton, Lessard, Modest & Solomon, supra note 92, at 111-83 ("People often think
they know about their mortgage, but when actually queried, the state of their knowledge is
incomplete."); Dunn & McFall, Consumer Focus Groups Praise Mortgage Bankers' Good
Service, Real Est. Today, Dec. 13, 1985, at 10, col. 1 (relating that recent interviews with
homeowners indicate that they have "an overwhelming lack of knowledge on all aspects of
financing a home").
98 Cf. Landers & Rohner, A Functional Analysis of Truth in Lending, 26 UCLA L. Rev.
711, 729 (1979) (arguing that shopping for default terms might not be rational because it is
unlikely to produce benefits and the search costs associated with it are high). Nevertheless, the
standardization of mortgage forms over the past 20 years has probably reduced the costs for
highly motivated shoppers to gather information about default terms. See Schill, supra note 2
(discussing the standardization of mortgage documentation).
99 Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 90, at 1420-24 (concluding, in
the context of the provision of security, that if insufficient shopping exists to sustain a
competitive equilibrium for loans, lenders would not require more security than borrowers
desire, though they might charge supracompetitive prices). This conclusion requires an
assumption that consumers prefer unsecured loans to secured loans, given a choice at the
relevant competitive prices. Id. at 1423. Schwartz and Wilde do not examine whether this
HeinOnline  -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 520 1991
1991] Mortgagor Protection Laws
shoppers and nonshoppers, it is unlikely that they would reduce the
supply of mortgagor protections below the level that mortgagors pre-
fer. It is far more likely that if mortgagees could discriminate among
shoppers and nonshoppers that they would take advantage of non-
shoppers by charging noncompetitive interest rates.1°° In any event,
insufficient shopping should not be an impediment to the existence of
an optimal supply of mortgagor protections.101
C. Imperfect Lender Information
Relaxing the assumption of perfect mortgagee information about
the prospects of mortgagor default places in doubt the conclusion of
the previous Subpart that lenders would offer borrowers an optimal
set of mortgagor protections absent government intervention. Clearly
the assumption of perfect lender information is not borne out by the
mortgage market. The parties to a loan transaction typically have
asymmetric information about the likelihood of default. 1 2 Mortga-
gees usually have better information than mortgagors about the his-
torical patterns of default and the likelihood that future defaults will
be caused by macroeconomic forces. Nevertheless, despite the use of
assumption is realistic. Id. at 1425. Given my assumption that borrowers are more risk averse
than lenders, it is likely that mortgagors would prefer a loan with mortgagor protections to a
loan without such protections if given the choice at competitive prices.
100 Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, Intervening in Markets, supra note 90, at 665-66 (stating that if
firms can discriminate among shoppers and nonshoppers, they may charge higher prices and
provide lower quality).
101 The conclusion that profit-maximizing lenders would offer nonshopping borrowers
mortgagor protections relies upon the assumption that lenders can accurately estimate the
likelihood that an individual borrower will default. Once this assumption is relaxed, lenders
might not be willing to offer these protections due to problems of adverse selection. See infra
text accompanying notes 105-11. An additional caveat exists to the conclusion that lenders
would voluntarily offer an optimal level of mortgagor protections in the absence of shopping.
Mortgage originators increasingly earn their profits based upon the volume of loans they
originate. They may therefore find it contrary to their interest to dwell on matters of default,
because this might either cause homebuyers to back out of the transaction or to minimize the
amount of their borrowing. Cf. Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 90, at
1430 ('[Llenders will be unlikely to correct consumers' misperceptions by stressing how likely
a default may be because such an action will decrease lenders' profits from making loans.").
102 See D. Jaffee & K. Rosen, Asymmetric Information and the Mortgage Market 21
(Center for Real Estate & Urban Economic Review Working Paper No. 89-155, 1988)
(presented to the annual meeting of the American Economics Association) (observing that
"preliminary empirical tests . . . are consistent with the hypothesis that asymmetric
information has been a significant factor in creating higher mortgage delinquency rates").
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elaborate screening devices,10 3 mortgagors have better information
than mortgagees concerning their personal financial status, payment
practices, and future consumption plans.104
Asymmetric information may lead to market failure as a result of
adverse selection. 10 5 In Part I, I suggest that mortgagor protections
could usefully be conceptualized as a form of insurance against
default. Insurance involves the aggregation of uncorrelated risks in a
pool. As the number of insured risks in the pool increases, so will the
accuracy of predictions of expected loss. However, insurance markets
require that insured risks with similar levels of exposure be segregated
into separate pools." 6 If risks are not segregated in this manner
because of the inability of the insurer to distinguish among different
risk groups, low risk insureds will subsidize high risk individuals
through their insurance premiums.107 Adverse selection will result as
individuals with higher risks are attracted by insurance premiums
that are priced below their expected cost. Eventually, the premiums
charged to low risk individuals may exceed their willingness to pay,
and they will drop out of the market.108 Depending upon the severity
of informational asymmetries and the level of risk aversion of the
insured parties," 9 adverse selection may prevent insurance markets
from reaching an equilibrium level of insurance agreements.110
103 See id. at 4-6 (discussing the limited utility of mortgagee screening devices); cf. T.
Sullivan, E. Warren & . Westbrook, supra note 3, at 313 (asserting that many of the questions
asked by creditors are ineffective in predicting bankruptcy).
104 See Dunn & Spatt, Private Information and Incentives: Implications for Mortgage
Contract Terms and Pricing, 1 J. Real Est. Fin. & Econ. 47, 47 (1988) (noting that consumers
have private information unobservable to lenders, such as their personal prepayment and
default characteristics); cf. T. Sullivan, E. Warren & J. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 102
(discussing similarity between debtors in bankruptcy and Americans generally).
105 See K. Abraham, Distributing Risk 15 (1986) (discussing adverse selection).
106 See Priest, supra note 37, at 1540-41.
107 Id. at 1541.
108 Id.
109 Low-risk individuals who are highly risk-averse may not drop out of the insurance pool
despite their subsidizing of higher-risk insureds. A low-risk insured will drop out when the
premium she pays exceeds her expected loss and risk premium. A risk premium is the amount
that a risk-averse person is willing to pay, over and above the expected loss, in order to avoid a
particular risk. Id. at 1541.
110 See J. Cummins, B. Smith, R. Vance & J. VanDerhei, Risk Classification in Life
Insurance 27 (1983) (stating that the inability to classify risks may lead to restrictions in the
availability of insurance coverage); Rothschild & Stiglitz, Equilibrium in Competitive
Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information, 90 Q.J. Econ. 629,
629 (1976) (explaining that asymmetries in information may result in the absence of a
[Vol. 77:489
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Homebuyers with high subjective probabilities of default would be
among the groups most likely to purchase mortgagor protections if
they were offered by mortgagees. 1 1 Lenders would encounter diffi-
culty in identifying these high risk individuals and charging them
more for protections than they would charge low risk individuals.
The increased price of mortgagor protections attributable to the dis-
proportionate number of high risk purchasers would lead many low
risk borrowers to prefer loans with no mortgagor protections. Even-
tually, this adverse selection might cause lenders to withdraw unprof-
itable mortgagor protections from the market even though the
aggregate benefits they would generate in the absence of adverse selec-
tion would exceed their costs.
Even if adverse selection of the type described above did not lead
markets to provide a sub-optimal level of mortgagor protection, mar-
ket failure might be brought about by signaling. In markets with
asymmetric information, such as mortgage markets, low risk borrow-
ers have an incentive to signal to lenders the fact that they are good
credit risks. 1 2 If mortgagor protections were offered by mortgagees,
even borrowers who would benefit from protection might choose to
forgo protection to signal their creditworthiness to the lender.11 3
Mortgagors who opt for mortgagor protections might be labeled bad
credit risks and charged actuarially unfair prices for the mortgagor
protections or, alternatively, be denied credit altogether.1 1 4
The use by borrowers and lenders of the demand for mortgagor
protections as a proxy for credit risk might lead to an inefficient level
competitive equilibrium); cf. Akerlof, The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism, 84 Q.J. Econ. 488, 490 (1970) (stating that asymmetrical information
about the quality of a product (used cars) may lead to a sequence of events that effectively
prevent the operation of a market).
III In addition, homebuyers with high levels of risk aversion and those with strong
preferences to equalize the marginal utility of income over different periods of time would
disproportionately purchase mortgagor protections.
112 The possible benefits of this signaling would be lower interest rates, more lenient terms,
and a greater likelihood of loan approval.
113 See Rea, Arm-Breaking, Consumer Credit and Personal Bankruptcy, 22 Econ. Inquiry
188, 196-97 (1984) (speculating that low risk borrowers might offer to have their arms broken
upon default as a signal of their likelihood to repay loan); see also Scott, supra note 85, at 747
(proposing that granting the creditor a coercive remedy such as repossession may signal the
creditor that the borrower will not misbehave).
114 See Barth, Cordes & Yezer, Benefits and Costs of Legal Restrictions on Personal Loan
Markets, 29 LL. & Econ. 357, 368 (1986) (noting that "tagging" of borrowers may contribute
to preventing the market from functioning correctly).
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of mortgagor protection. Like other forms of insurance, mortgagor
protections do not benefit only those most likely to experience unfor-
tunate events. To the contrary, insurance also improves the welfare of
risk averse individuals by permitting them to reduce their own risks
by pooling their risks with those of others." 5 This efficiency-enhanc-
ing attribute of insurance exists regardless of whether the insured has
a high or low probability of experiencing the event entitling her to
insurance proceeds. Therefore, treating the demand for mortgagor
protections as a proxy for credit risk is likely to be extremely overin-
clusive. If signaling occurs, allocative inefficiencies might result from
borrowers who would benefit from mortgagor protections underinsur-
ing, or, alternatively, from extremely risk averse individuals paying
excessive prices for coverage. In addition, to the extent that borrower
fears of signaling result in borrowers who have only high subjective
probabilities of default or extremely high levels of risk aversion
purchasing mortgagor protections, demand may become insufficient
to sustain any market for mortgagor protections." 6
D. Imperfect Borrower Information
The final assumption in my model of mortgagor-mortgagee interac-
tion, that mortgagors accurately estimate their own risk of mortgage
default and foreclosure, is almost certainly incorrect. Mortgage
default is generally caused by a combination of factors, many of
which are outside the control of the mortgagor." 7 Empirical studies
demonstrate that mortgage default is frequently attributable to broad
economic conditions such as declining home values and unemploy-
ment rather than individual mortgagor conduct." 8 Therefore, mort-
11s See supra text accompanying note 36.
116 Nevertheless, it is possible that signaling could alleviate the problems generated by
asymmetric information in loan markets if the demand for mortgagor protections came
primarily from people with high actual probabilities of default. It is likely, however, that
mortgagor protections would also be requested by individuals with average probabilities of
default but high levels of risk aversion. See supra note 111. Signaling in the context of
mortgagor protections might lead to inefficiency not because signaling per se is inefficient, but
because the informational content of the signal is faulty.
117 However, to the extent that a mortgagor's default is caused by factors under her own
control, such as overconsumption or fraud, she may be able to predict the probability of
default with a high degree of accuracy. See supra text accompanying note 104.
118 See supra note 76 and accompanying text.
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gage default is unlikely to be predicted with any degree of precision by
most individual borrowers.
The observation that mortgagors are unlikely to be able to predict
accurately their likelihood of default says nothing about whether the
typical mortgagor tends to underestimate or overestimate default
probabilities. A substantial body of theoretical and empirical research
undertaken by psychologists, decision scientists, and economists,
however, supports the proposition that borrowers are likely to under-
estimate their probabilities of default. Expected utility theory posits
that when faced with two or more courses of action, individuals
should choose the alternative that maximizes their expected utility.'19
Controlled experiments, however, demonstrate that with respect to
many types of decisions people tend systematically to discount low
probability, high loss events. 120 These biases cause people to underes-
timate the expected costs generated by many of these events.
119 See R. Hogarth, Judgement and Choice 88 (2d ed. 1988). "The expected utility of an
alternative is calculated by taking a weighted sum of the utilities associated with the outcomes
of the alternative under the different possible (uncertain) states." Id.
120 See K. Abraham, supra note 105, at 22:
[T]here is growing evidence that... [i]n at least some settings, people tend to overvalue
risks with a high probability of occurrence but small potential severity and to
undervalue low probability but high severity risks. The result is a tendency in the
aggregate for people to purchase too much low-limits coverage and not enough
protection against catastrophic losses.
(footnote omitted); H. Kunreuther, Disaster Insurance Protection: Public Policy Lessons 185-
86 (1978) (indicating that insurance decisions suggest that people discount or ignore low
probability, high loss events such as floods and earthquakes); Weinstein, Klotz & Sandman,
Promoting Remedial Response to the Risk of Radon: Are Information Campaigns Enough?,
14 Sci. Tech. & Hum. Values 360, 370-71 (1989) (proposing that people tend to underestimate
the hazards of radon because it cannot be detected sensorially or readily connected to specific
instances of cancer). But see Noll & Krier, Some Implications of Cognitive Psychology for
Risk Regulation, 19 J. Legal Stud. 747, 755 (1990) (explaining that prospect theory suggests
that "people behave as if they think that low-probability events are more likely than their own
beliefs about the probabilities would suggest").
Social scientists have shown, however, that individuals do not underestimate all low
probability, high loss events. In fact, several studies show that people frequently overestimate
the likelihood that they will suffer serious bodily injury or death from sudden, catastrophic
sources. See Lichtenstein, Slovic, Fischhoff, Layman & Combs, Judged Frequency of Lethal
Events, 4 J. Experimental Psychology Hum. Learning & Memory 551, 575 (1978) (concluding
that dramatic or sensational causes of death tend to be greatly overestimated); Magat, Viscusi
& Huber, Risk-Dollar Tradeoffs, Risk Perceptions and Consumer Behavior in Learning About
Risk: Consumer and Worker Responses to Hazard Information 83, 93 (W. Viscusi & W.
Magat eds. 1987) [hereinafter Learning About Risk]:
Consumer responses may vary with the kinds of risks involved even though their wel-
fare implications are the same.... [R]isk perceptions are influenced by many aspects of
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The failure of individuals to estimate accurately the likelihood of
low probability, high loss events might be attributable to transaction
costs. Gathering sufficient data to make reasonably accurate esti-
mates of relatively rare events is both costly and time-consuming.121
In addition, even if such data were to be made available to consumers
at relatively low prices, processing it in such a way as to make it sali-
ent would still likely require substantial time and effort. Further-
more, if the information concerns an unpleasant matter such as death,
destruction, or economic ruin, the psychic costs of meaningfully eval-
uating the options might exceed the benefits generated.122 Incorrect
estimations of the likelihood of low probability, high loss events may,
therefore, be the result of rational, utility-maximizing behavior.
Though transaction costs might explain why individuals estimate
probabilities incorrectly, such costs do not explain why individuals
would systematically underestimate the likelihood of, and expected
losses from, many low probability events such as mortgage foreclo-
sure. Several theories exist to explain why people apparently fail to
act according to the parameters of expected utility theory. According
to some psychologists, people use "heuristics" (rules of thumb) to
process information and reach decisions.1 23 Among the heuristics
most relevant to estimating one's probability of mortgage default is
the "availability" heuristic. According to the availability heuristic,
the risk, such as the immediacy of the hazard and whether the outcome leads to visible
and sensational outcomes, as in the case of tornadoes.
But cf. Gillette & Krier, Risk, Courts, and Agencies, 138 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1027, 1074-76 (1990)
(observing that differing perceptions of risk between lay individuals and expert risk assessors is
not simply attributable to inaccurate fatality assessments, but instead reflects that lay individu-
als have a fuller idea of risk). Magat, Viscusi, and Huber also suggest that the results of
empirical studies might be consistent with the hypothesis that people underestimate or tend to
ignore the likelihood of low probability financial risks. See Magat, Viscusi & Huber, supra, at
93.
121 See K. Abraham, supra note 105, at 14 (explaining how transaction costs may lead
individuals to make risk-related decisions that do not serve their interests).
122 Cf. Akerlof & Dickens, The Economic Consequences of Cognitive Dissonance, 72 Am.
Econ. Rev. 307, 317 (1982) (compulsory old age insurance may be justified on the ground that
individuals would otherwise underinsure because they "prefer not to contemplate a time when
their earning power is diminished"); Camerer & Kunreuther, Decision Processes for Low
Probability Events: Policy Implications, 8 J. Pol'y Analysis & Mgmt. 565, 578 (1989)
(proposing that one reason people may buy little insurance against hazards such as
earthquakes is that it would remind them of their vulnerability to risk).
123 See R. Nisbett & L. Ross, Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social
Judgment 7 (1980).
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people are more likely to judge an event as being frequent or probable
if the event is readily available in their memory.1 24 Because many
factors other than its actual frequency or statistical probability affect
whether an event is retained in one's memory, the availability heuris-
tic may lead to unreliable probability estimates. 12  For example, one
might be more likely to remember events that are vivid, that have
occurred to people one knows, or that have occurred to people to
whom one is related. Events such as mortgage foreclosure happen
only infrequently and are unlikely to be publicized by those unfortu-
nate enough to experience them. Therefore, because most people
either do not know someone who has defaulted on his mortgage or are
unaware of that person's foreclosure, it is likely that they will tend to
discount the probability of foreclosure happening to them. 26
Systematic underestimation of the probability of mortgage default
may also be attributable to "anchoring." Anchoring describes a cog-
nitive bias that results from the tendency of people to make estimates
by reference to a particular starting point.2 7 In essence, anchoring
results in a person "process[ing] new information in a way that leaves
124 See id. at 7; Tversky & Kalneman, Availability: A Heuristic for Judging Frequency and
Probability, 5 Cognitive Psychology 207, 208 (1973).
125 See P. Nisbett & L. Ross, supra note 123, at 19. The availability heuristic might also
explain why people tend to overestimate the probability of relatively rare causes of death. See
supra note 120. Deaths from airplane crashes and exposure to nuclear radiation are
particularly vivid and well-publicized. Therefore, they are more likely to remain in one's
memory. Cf. Combs & Slovic, Newspaper Coverage of Causes of Death, 56 Journalism Q.
837, 843 (1979) (reporting on a study that shows violent and catastrophic causes of death are
overreported and that this bias in coverage corresponds to individual biases with respect to the
frequency of these causes of death).
126 Nevertheless, it is likely that at least some individuals overestimate their probability of
mortgage foreclosure. A market exists for decreasing term life insurance earmarked to pay off
the insured party's mortgage should he or she die prior to its maturity. Commentators have
observed that the price of this insurance exceeds what it would cost an individual to purchase a
similar amount of ordinary, nonearmarked term insurance. See Dunn, "Pennies-A-Day"
Insurance Probably Isn't Worth It, Bus. Wk., Jan. 30, 1989, at 98.
127 Tversky & Kalneman, Judgment Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases in Judgment
Under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases 3, 14 (D. Kalneman, P. Slovic & A. Tversky eds.
1982). A simple experiment conducted by Tversky and Kahneman illustrates the anchoring
phenomenon. Two groups of subjects were given five seconds to estimate the product of a
series of identical numbers. With one group, the numbers were arrayed from the smallest to
the largest; the other was given numbers arrayed in the inverse order, from largest to smallest.
The subjects with the numbers arrayed from smallest to largest responded with estimates much
below those of the subjects whose numbers were arrayed from largest to smallest. See id. at 14-
18 (discussing the results of several controlled experiments demonstrating the anchoring
phenomenon).
HeinOnline  -- 77 Va. L. Rev. 527 1991
Virginia Law Review [Vol. 77:489
him too close to the conclusion he would have reached in the absence
of that information." 128  Commentators have observed that anchoring
will lead people to overestimate their prospects of success and to
underestimate their prospects of failure. 12 9 These studies suggest that
borrowers are apt to overestimate their chances of successfully repay-
ing a mortgage loan and underestimate their probability of default
and foreclosure. 130
The tendency of individuals to underestimate their risk of mortgage
default because of the use of judgmental heuristics is likely to be exac-
erbated by motivational factors. Psychologists have repeatedly shown
in experimental settings that people tend to be optimistic about their
expectations of both positive and negative events. When subjects are
128 Jackson, The Fresh-Start Policy in Bankruptcy Law, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 1393, 1411 (1985)
(footnote omitted).
129 See id. at 1411-12 ("Much evidence indicates that the errors associated with incomplete
heuristics, especially anchoring, lead decisionmakers systematically to overestimate chances of
success and to underestimate the corresponding risks."); Tversky & Kalmeman, supra note
127, at 16 ("The general tendency to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events leads to
unwarranted optimism in the evaluation of the likelihood that a plan will succeed or that a
project will be completed on time."). Overestimation of success and underestimation of failure
are explained by the tendency of people to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events
and underestimate the likelihood of disjunctive events. Successfully repaying a loan is a
conjunctive event: one must successfully make payments each month for a lengthy period of
time. The probability of successfully repaying the entire loan is therefore much less than the
probability of making each individual payment. Nevertheless, anchoring suggests that people's
estimates of successful loan repayment will be influenced by their having successfully made
each individual payment in the past. Because their starting point is successful payment, they
will tend to discount the probability of failure on some future payment. See Tversky &
Kahneman, supra note 127, at 15-16; see also Tversky & Kahneman, Extensional Versus
Intuitive Reasoning: The Conjunction Fallacy in Probability Judgment, 90 Psychological Rev.
293, 307-08 (1983) (demonstrating that people tend to overestimate the likelihood of
conjunctive events); Wolford, Taylor & Beck, The Conjunction Fallacy?, 18 Memory &
Cognition 47, 51-52 (1990) (finding that in test situations in which subjects do not assume that
the outcome of a scenario is known, a majority continue to rate conjunctive occurrences as
more likely than each individual component occurrence).
130 See Jackson, supra note 128, at 1412 n.60 (stating that "existing hypotheses suggest that
individuals will underestimate the risks inherent in repayment"); Scott, supra note 85, at 769
("Individuals tend to overestimate the probability of conjunctive events, such as the events
leading to successful repayment, and to underestimate the risk of disjunctive events, such as
those causing default." (footnote omitted)). But see Schwartz, supra note 40, at 379 ("The
evidence fails to show that consumers misperceive risk levels to the extent that undesirable
equilibria exist."). Loan default may, of course, also be recharacterized as a conjunctive event:
the borrower loses her job, is unable to repay her mortgage loan, and defaults. Nevertheless,
the anchoring heuristic is unlikely to lead borrowers who have not already defaulted to
overestimate their likelihood of default-the borrower in good standing will be anchored
toward successful repayment rather than delinquent payment or default.
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asked to rate the probabilities that they and a third party will encoun-
ter negative events, they consistently rate their own probability of
encountering the event lower than the third party's. 131 Among the
reasons suggested for this tendency are defensiveness, wishful think-
ing, 132 and the adoption of negative stereotypes for people who
encounter controllable, negative events.1 33
If people underestimate the expected costs attributable to low
probability, high loss events, they may not purchase an optimal level
of insurance.13 4  Indeed, studies show that individuals often fail to
purchase insurance for low probability, high loss events, even when
premiums are actuarially favorable. For example, homeowners in
flood-prone areas have repeatedly been shown to fail to purchase flood
insurance even though the premiums are heavily subsidized by the
federal government. 135 Paul Slovic's experiments also show that peo-
131 See Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. Personality & Soc.
Psychology 806, 813 (1980) (reporting that experiments provide evidence of "unrealistic
optimism" with respect to both positive and negative events); Zakay, The Influence of
Perceived Event's Controllability on Its Subjective Occurrence Probability, 34 Psychological
Rec. 233, 238 (1984) (relating that estimated personal probabilities for both controllable and
uncontrollable negative events are less than estimated probabilities for third parties); Zakay,
The Relationship Between the Probability Assessor and the Outcomes of an Event as a
Determiner of Subjective Probability, 53 Acta Psychologica 271, 278 (1983):
This pattern of probability assessment can be described in terms of the following belief:
"If the event is of positive value, it is more likely to happen to me than to others, and if
it is of negative value it is less likely to happen to me than to others."
But see Schwartz, supra note 40, at 379 (discussing evidence that people perceive risks
accurately).
132 See Miller & Ross, Self-Serving Biases in the Attribution of Causality: Fact or Fiction?,
82 Psychological Bull. 213, 222 (1975) (suggesting that optimistic biases may be attributable to
defensiveness and wishful thinking); Perloff, Perceptions of Vulnerability to Victimization, 39
J. Soc. Issues 41, 45 (1983) (stating that "perceptions of unique invulnerability may stem from
ego-defensive mechanisms").
133 See Weinstein, supra note 131, at 808 (proposing that people who do not see themselves
fitting a stereotype are unlikely to believe that the event will happen to them).
134 See G. Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal and Economic Analysis 55-58 (1970)
(stating that private insurance may be inadequate when people are incapable of evaluating
risk); Schwartz, supra note 40, at 375 ("Consumers will underinsure if they underestimate the
risk of harm."). Concluding that underestimation of risk leads to underinsurance implies some
benchmark of adequate insurance. Deciding what level of insurance is adequate for
individuals raises several troubling issues. See infra notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
135 See H. Kunreuther, supra note 120, at 6; Anderson, The National Flood Insurance
Program-Problems and Potential, 41 J. Risk & Ins. 579, 586 (1974) (reporting that few
communities participated in the subsidized flood insurance program); Anderson & Weinrobe,
Insurance Issues Related to Mortgage Default Risks Associated with Natural Disasters, 53 J.
Risk & Ins. 501, 503 (1986) (noting that even in high hazard areas owners rarely purchase
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ple do not typically purchase insurance for low probability, high loss
events, despite premiums that are actuarially fair. Instead, individu-
als have a strong preference for insuring against high probability, low
loss events. 136
If the assumption of perfect borrower information is relaxed, pri-
vate mortgage markets may fail to supply an optimal set of mortgagor
protections. Mortgage defaults are low probability events that usually
involve large losses for the mortgagor. Borrowers are likely to under-
estimate the probability that they will default and face foreclosure.
Because borrowers probably underestimate the expected loss attribu-
table to default and foreclosure, they are unlikely to demand an opti-
mal level of mortgagor protections.
IV. GOVERNMENT INTERVENTION, MORTGAGE MARKETS, AND
MORTGAGOR PROTECTIONS
In Part I of this Article I propose that mortgagor protections be
conceptualized as a form of insurance designed to protect borrowers
from the adverse effects of default and foreclosure. The net present
value simulation and multiple regression analysis presented in Part II
indicate that the cost of existing mortgagor protection laws is likely to
be modest. These modest costs suggest that the existence of mortga-
gor protections might promote economic efficiency. In Part III, I
examine whether the private market could be relied upon to provide
an efficient level of mortgagor protection and conclude that the mar-
ket might fail to supply an optimal level because of imperfect informa-
tion on the part of both lenders and borrowers. Adverse selection and
earthquake insurance); Slovic, Fischhoff & Lichtenstein, Regulation of Risk: A Psychological
Perspective in Regulatory Policy and the Social Sciences 241, 259-61 (R. Noll ed. 1985)
(examining why even with federally subsidized rates few property owners purchased flood
insurance). Kunreuther notes that people also do not purchase federally subsidized crime
insurance or earthquake insurance. H. Kunreuther, supra note 120, at 7, 15-16.
136 See Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein, Corrigan & Combs, Preference for Insuring Against
Probable Small Losses: Insurance Implications, 44 J. Risk & Ins. 237, 253 (1977). Slovic et al.
suggest two possible reasons for the failure to insure against low probability, high loss events.
It may be that people are risk seekers with respect to losses and risk averse with respect to
gains. Alternatively, people may refuse to worry about losses when the probability of the event
generating the losses dips below a certain threshold. See id. at 253-54; see also H. Kunreuther,
supra note 120, at 236 (suggesting that people may ignore risks whose probability is below a
threshold level); Eldred, How Wisely Do Consumers Select Their Property and Liability
Insurance Coverage?, 14 J. Consumer Aff. 288, 292-97 (1980) (stating that consumers tend to
purchase insurance with excessively low policy coverage limits and deductibles).
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signaling may cause lenders to refuse to offer mortgagor protections
or to offer them at actuarially unfair prices; borrower underestimation
of the risk of default may lead to insufficient demand and
underinsurance.
In this Part, I examine whether government intervention in mort-
gage markets might be justified on efficiency grounds to correct these
potential market failures. I conclude that government intervention
may be justified, either to provide mortgagors with information or to
mandate mortgagor protection. States that choose to require mortga-
gor protection might adopt policies such as statutory rights of
redemption and deficiency judgment prohibitions. Alternatively, to
minimize allocative inefficiencies generated by these laws, states might
consider replacing statutory rights of redemption and anti-deficiency
judgment legislation with a compulsory mortgage foreclosure insur-
ance program.
A. Government Intervention in Mortgage Markets
Even if private markets fail to provide an efficient level of mortga-
gor protections, government intervention would be justified only if it
could, in some way, correct the market failure.137 Because the market
failure in this case is caused by imperfect information, the government
might be able to improve market outcomes by either mandating dis-
closure on the part of lenders or disseminating information itself.131
The government might be effective in improving borrower informa-
tion about the likelihood of mortgage default. Government agencies
and federally-related secondary mortgage market agencies already
collect a wealth of information about mortgage defaults and foreclo-
sures. They could publish this information and disseminate it to bor-
rowers. One potentially cost-effective way of disseminating this
information would be to incorporate it into the disclosure statements
already mandated by federal law. 139
Information dissemination alone might not, however, lead mortga-
gors to estimate their own probability of default accurately and to act
accordingly. Mortgagors would still face substantial difficulties in
137 See supra text accompanying note 85.
138 See Beales, Craswell & Salop, Information Remedies for Consumer Protection, 71 Am.
Econ. Rev. 410, 413 (1981) ("Information remedies are most likely to be the most effective
solution to information problems.").
139 See supra note 95.
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processing the information in a way that would be meaningful to
them.14° Even if the time and psychic energy required to process the
information were not excessive, mortgagors might still fail to estimate
risk accurately. Several studies find that the cognitive failures dis-
cussed in Part III exist even when individuals have sufficient informa-
tion. 1 41 Furthermore, government provision of information would do
little to minimize adverse selection-government has no comparative
advantage over private lenders in assessing the riskiness of particular
borrowers.
A second alternative would be for governments to mandate mortga-
gor protections through state laws, much as they do today.142 Never-
theless, the government should act cautiously in using regulation to
correct market failures attributable to imperfect information. Com-
pulsory contractual provisions may be troubling in that they limit the
140 See Schwartz & Wilde, Imperfect Information, supra note 90, at 1459 ("Decisionmakers
face substantial practical problems in correctly ascertaining the odds, developing concise and
comprehensible formats for disclosure, and conveying the essential facts in such a way that
consumers will pay attention to them.").
141 See Slovic, Informing and Educating the Public About Risk, 6 Risk Analysis 403, 403
(1986) ("T]he goal of informing the public about risk issues, which seems easy to attain in
principle, is surprisingly difficult to accomplish."); Weinstein, Klotz & Sandman, supra note
120, at 376 (indicating that mere provision of information about environmental hazards such
as radon "will not be sufficient to ensure decisions consistent with the actual level of risk");
Wolford, Taylor & Beck, supra note 129, at 52 (observing that over 40% of subjects with
statistical training continue to make the conjunction fallacy). But see Brookshire, Thayer,
Tschirhart & Schulze, A Test of the Expected Utility Model: Evidence from Earthquake
Risks, 93 J. Pol. Econ. 369, 378 (1985) (revealing that designation of earthquake sensitive
zones and required disclosure to prospective real property buyers seems to cause homebuyers
to pay less for property located in such zones); Viscusi, Magat & Huber, The Effect of Risk
Information on Precautionary Behavior, in Learning About Risk, supra note 120, at 60, 82
("[Labeling] information can produce precautionary behavior consistent with the most salient
predictions of rational economic actions."). Studies demonstrating that individuals have an
optimistic bias cast further doubt on the efficacy of information disclosure. Even if borrowers
were advised of default probabilities, they might nevertheless believe that they are less likely to
default than the average person, due to wishful thinking, ego-defensive behavior, or the
adoption of negative stereotypes. See supra text accompanying notes 131-33.
142 See Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 122, at 584 ("For some risks, it may be cheaper
and more efficient to require certain actions than to induce people to take those actions
voluntarily with incentives or information."); Whitford, A Critique of the Consumer Credit
Collection System, 1979 Wis. L. Rev. 1047, 1074 ("[G]iven the relative infrequency of default,
regulation of the collection system to achieve the system many or most customers would
choose if well informed may be more practical or efficient than undertaking a consumer
education program to inform all persons entering credit transactions of the harms associated
with execution."); see also Camerer & Kunreuther, supra note 122, at 581 (discussing evidence
that information provision may fail to improve decisionmaking).
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range of choices available to consumers. 143 State-mandated mortga-
gor protections will promote economic efficiency only if the govern-
ment is able to estimate what the utility functions of homebuyers
would be absent cognitive error. If the government is unable to pre-
dict how much protection the typical, fully informed mortgagor
would demand, its intervention may lead to a level of protection less
optimal than that which the market would have provided absent
regulation.14
B. Redesigning Mortgagor Protection Laws
States that opt to mandate mortgagor protections should reexamine
the structure of current mortgagor protection laws. 45 Mortgagor
protection laws frequently apply to all mortgagors in a state, regard-
less of whether they are individual homeowners or multinational cor-
porations. 146 Reconceptualizing mortgagor protections as a form of
insurance suggests that the sweep of many mortgagor protection laws
is much too wide. Large business enterprises are generally thought to
be considerably less risk averse than individual homebuyers, and they
are therefore less likely to benefit from insurance. These businesses
have opportunities to minimize the risk of mortgage foreclosure, such
as diversification of assets' 47 and self-insurance, 148 that are unavaila-
143 See supra note 85; cf. D. Bickelhaupt, supra note 37, at 78 (noting that social insurance
limits individual freedom).
144 An additional inefficiency could occur if mandated mortgagor protections prevented
borrowers from using coercive remedies as a "precommitment or self-command mechanism"
in long-term contracts. Scott, supra note 85, at 770; Scott, Error and Rationality in Individual
Decisionmaking: An Essay on the Relationship Between Cognitive Illusions and the
Management of Choices, 59 S. Cal. L. Rev. 329, 342-49 (1986) (arguing that regulations
prohibiting coercive remedies that ex post seem to promote efficiency may actually promote
inefficiency because consumers will no longer be able to use self-generated behavioral rules to
discourage weak will and to control the incentives to default in long-term contracts).
145 My analysis of alternative mortgagor protection laws is limited to efficiency-enhancing
modifications. State legislators may wish to consider other societal objectives in modifying
their real estate finance laws. See supra note 4.
146 Some states, however, do distinguish between mortgages secured by residences and those
secured by nonresidential properties. See, e.g., Kan. Stat. Ann. § 60-2414 (1983) (redemption
statute permitting mortgagors to waive their redemption rights except when the mortgage
secures a dwelling, or dwellings, occupied by no more than two families or agricultural land);
see also supra note 13 (deficiency judgment prohibitions in some states apply only to
mortgages or deeds of trust securing residences).
147 Diversification typically involves investing in a number of unrelated assets to reduce the
magnitude of loss from an uncertain event. See J. Van Home, Financial Management and
Policy 46 (6th ed. 1983).
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ble to most homeowners. If the primary purpose underlying mortga-
gor protection laws is to insure against the adverse effects of default
and foreclosure, then these laws ought to be amended to cover only
those who need the protections-homebuyers and, perhaps, small
businesses.
Furthermore, although the existence of mortgagor protection laws
may promote efficiency, the laws may not be optimally designed from
the perspective of either the borrower or the lender. Anti-deficiency
judgment laws may promote a moral hazard 149 on the part of the bor-
rower. Once a borrower's equity evaporates because of falling house
prices or accrued, but unpaid, interest and penalties, he no longer has
any incentive to maintain the value of the property securing the loan
or protect it from waste if he is insulated from personal liability. 150
Statutory rights of redemption may be even more troubling.
Although redemption rights permit borrowers to repurchase their
property after foreclosure, and therefore preserve the subjective value
they place on their homes, such laws probably chill bidding at foreclo-
sure sales. Third party purchasers are unlikely to bid the fair market
value of properties when they must bear the risk that their purchase
will be unraveled a year later. Laws that permit mortgagors to
remain in possession of the property during the redemption period
exacerbate the disincentives to purchase because they create a height-
ened risk of waste.
148 Self-insurance is a risk retention mechanism in which a private firm or governmental
body plans to pay the losses it incurs from its own funds. See C. William & R. Heins, supra
note 36, at 227. Self-insurance is typically used by finns or entities that: 1) are large enough to
assume risk; 2) can reasonably predict future losses; and 3) can benefit from obtaining control
over their losses through improved claims processing. If a firm is capable of self-insuring, it
gains the added advantage of saving the loading charges that would have to be paid to an
outside insurer. See Young, Self-Insurance in Risk Management Today: A How To Guide for
Local Government 59, 59-61 (N. Wasserman & D. Phelus eds. 1985).
149 A "moral hazard" is a situation in which an insured person or entity might take some
action causing a loss or fail to take some action within its power to avoid a loss because of the
existence of the insurance. See A. Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 56 (2d
ed. 1989).
150 Some states that generally prohibit deficiency judgments permit damage actions against
mortgagors if waste is attributable to reckless, intentional, or malicious despoliation of
property. See Cornelison v. Kornbluth, 15 Cal. 3d 590, 603-05, 542 P.2d 981, 990-92, 125 Cal.
Rptr. 557, 566-68 (1975). Nevertheless, borrowers who are merely negligent in failing to take
appropriate precautions to protect the value of their property would probably not fall within
the court's "bad faith" exception and therefore would still be insulated from personal liability
in California.
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The insurance-based justification for mortgagor protection laws
developed in this Article suggests an alternative to existing mortgagor
protection laws. State legislators who wish to provide assistance to
mortgagors might consider structuring mortgagor protection as an
insurance program. At the closing of a home purchase, a buyer
would purchase mortgage foreclosure insurance.151 In the event of
default, the borrower would be entitled to a payment that would ame-
liorate the adverse effects of foreclosure. States could earmark the
insurance either to pay for certain items, such as an additional period
of time for the borrower to remain in possession of the property, or,
alternatively, to pay for personal liability on the debt. Perhaps a more
efficient insurance program would allow the individual debtor who
has defaulted to decide for himself how to spend the insurance pro-
ceeds. 152 To avoid the problems created by imperfect information dis-
cussed in Part III, the state could make mortgage foreclosure
insurance compulsory,1 53 as it has done for other low probability
events such as floods.' 54
151 The insurance program could be administered by the state or private sector.
152 Mortgage foreclosure often occurs in the context of personal bankruptcy. See T.
Holloway & R. Rosenblatt, supra note 76, at 29 (National Foreclosure Survey indicates that
10% to 15% of the loans in foreclosure are subject to a bankruptcy stay). For a program of
mortgage foreclosure insurance to have the desired effect of protecting borrowers from the
adverse effects of default, a state might have to adjust its laws governing what property is
exempt under the bankruptcy laws to include the proceeds of the mortgage foreclosure
insurance. Under the bankruptcy law, exempt property remains free from the reach of
creditors. See T. Sullivan, E. Warren & J. Westbrook, supra note 3, at 27-30.
153 See Johnson, Choice of Compulsory Insurance Schemes Under Adverse Selection, 31
Pub. Choice 23, 34 (1977) (stating that "[c]ompulsory insurance can be a Pareto optimal
policy in insurance markets with adverse selection"); Kaplow, supra note 42, at 548-49 (stating
that compulsory insurance is a potential solution to the problem of underestimation of risk).
154 Federal flood insurance was first established by Congress in 1968. See Senate Comm. on
Banking, Hous. and Urb. Affairs, Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, S. Rep. No. 583, 93d
Cong., 1st Sess. 3, reprinted in 1973 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3217, 3219. In 1973, to
encourage participation in the program, Congress required that all communities located in
flood-prone areas participate in the program or forfeit their right to receive federal
construction subsidies. In addition, the legislation prohibited federally regulated lending
institutions from making mortgage loans in areas that did not participate in the program.
Homebuyers who did not purchase flood insurance in participating communities were
ineligible for loans made by these institutions. See Flood Disaster Protection Act of 1973, Pub.
L. No. 93-234, §§ 102, 202, 87 Stat. 975, 978, 982 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C.
§§ 4012(a), 4106 (1988)). Under pressure from real estate developers, Congress amended the
program in 1977 to permit federally regulated lending institutions to make loans in
nonparticipating communities. See Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub.
L. No. 95-128, § 703, 91 Stat. 1111, 1144 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 4106 (1988)).
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Transforming existing state mortgagor protection laws into an
insurance program would also have additional efficiency-enhancing
effects on mortgage markets. In recent years, real estate capital mar-
kets have been integrated with national credit markets, largely as a
result of secondary mortgage market agencies buying and selling
mortgage loans and promoting their securitization. At present, the
secondary mortgage market does not fully price mortgages to reflect
the expected costs attributable to different state laws.155 States with
mortgagor protection laws probably do not bear the full costs of their
laws, but, instead, probably externalize a portion of those costs to bor-
rowers in other states. The externalization of costs increases the like-
lihood of states enacting mortgagor protection laws the aggregate
costs of which exceed their benefits. Although I do not believe, based
upon the net present value simulation presented in Part II, that these
externalized costs are likely to be significant, replacing mortgagor
protection laws with an insurance program would ensure that all of
the costs of mortgagor protections are borne by the mortgagors
through insurance premiums. 156 Furthermore, separating the cost of
mortgagor protections from the interest and principal payments made
by homebuyers has the added advantage of substantially reducing fis-
cal illusion. 157 Facing separated costs, homebuyers would be better
able to assess the costs and benefits of mortgagor protections. Armed
with these enhanced assessments, homebuyers could lobby their
Nevertheless, communities that do not participate may not receive federal construction
subsidies, and residents who do not participate may not obtain FHA or VA insured loans.
Further, borrowers in participating communities must still purchase flood insurance to qualify
for loans originated by federally regulated lending institutions. See Houck, Rising Water: The
National Flood Insurance Program and Louisiana, 60 Tul. L. Rev. 61, 70-71 (1985). Flood
risk is generally viewed as uninsurable by the private market because of adverse selection. See
Greene, A Review and Evaluation of Selected Government Programs to Handle Risk, 443
Annals 129, 131 (1979). Numerous social welfare programs may also be characterized as
mandatory insurance. See S. Rea, Disability Insurance and Public Policy 5 (1981); Diamond,
A Framework for Social Security Analysis, 8 J. Pub. Econ. 275, 296 (1977).
155 See Schill, supra note 2.
156 Replacing current state mortgagor protection laws with an insurance program would
also reduce the transaction and information costs created by divergent state mortgagor
protection laws. Although there may be some transaction and information cost reduction
achieved by repealing these laws, I do not believe that the amount of savings would be
significant. See id.
157 " 'Fiscal illusion' traditionally refers to the methods utilized by governments to disguise
the level of taxation in order to minimize taxpayer resistance." Schill, supra note 42, at 859 &
n. 115.
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elected representatives to alter or to eliminate the protections if they
determine that, on balance, the protections yield a net loss.
Compulsory mortgage foreclosure insurance might not, however,
eliminate mortgagor moral hazard and, in some circumstances, might
even exacerbate the problem. Mortgagors might be less careful in
making mortgage payments if they were insured against some of the
consequences of default. In addition, financially distressed mortga-
gors who would otherwise sell their homes to pay off loan balances
might prefer to default in order to collect the insurance proceeds.
There are reasons, however, to believe that the problem of moral haz-
ard is likely to be rather limited in the context of a compulsory mort-
gage foreclosure insurance program. In insurance markets, problems
of moral hazard are typically minimized by coinsurance. As long as
the act that entitles the insured party to collect the proceeds of insur-
ance is not costless, he or she will be less likely to reduce precautions
or default for the purpose of collecting insurance proceeds. Mortgage
default typically entails significant out-of-pocket expenses for a 'bor-
rower in the form of penalties, late fees, and acceleration of the
indebtedness, all of which could function as a form of coinsurance.15
Mortgagors who default would also lose the subjective value that they
place on their homes. In addition, default and foreclosure are likely
to harm a homebuyer's credit reputation, making it more difficult for
him to borrow funds in the future. If needed, states could take further
steps to minimize the problems posed by moral hazard by limiting the
coverage of mortgage foreclosure insurance to those defaults that
occur for reasons beyond the control of the mortgagor, such as unem-
ployment and precipitous drops in local or regional housing prices.1 5 9
CONCLUSION
In this Article I argue that the accepted wisdom regarding mortga-
gor protection laws requires substantial revision. I find, contrary to
158 Mortgagors with equity in their homes are also unlikely to default willfully and risk
foreclosure. This equity may effectively serve as an insurance deductible.
159 A different form of moral hazard could also be present. Mortgagors with foreclosure
insurance might borrow funds in excess of the amount that a fully informed, uninsured, risk
neutral person would borrow because they would be insulated from at least a portion of the
risk of default. Providers of mandatory mortgage foreclosure insurance could alleviate this
potential problem by adjusting the premium paid for the insurance to reflect estimates of
expected loss.
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the results of other empirical studies, that it is unlikely that mortga-
gor protection laws substantially increase the costs of home credit.
This empirical finding is consistent with the theory that when viewed
from an ex ante perspective, mortgagor protections may promote,
rather than impede, economic efficiency by functioning as a form of
insurance against the adverse effects of default and foreclosure. Gov-
ernment intervention in mortgage markets to mandate protection, in
the form of deficiency judgment prohibitions, statutory rights of
redemption, or a compulsory mortgage foreclosure insurance pro-
gram, may be necessary to correct market failures attributable to
imperfect information.
The economic implications of mortgagor protection laws are part of
a broader set of issues concerning the desirability of government regu-
lation of housing markets. In recent years, the cost of homeowner-
ship has outpaced the earning power of many Americans. After
consistently climbing since the end of World War II, the homeowner-
ship rate in the United States fell in the 1980s. Policymakers at all
levels of government have increasingly focused on ways to make hous-
ing markets more efficient and housing more affordable.
This Article fits into the current debate over the desirability of gov-
ernment regulation of housing markets in at least two ways. First, it
suggests that one set of laws that have been harshly criticized may
promote rather than impede economic efficiency. More broadly, the
analysis suggests that policymakers should proceed with caution in
their efforts to deregulate housing markets. There is little doubt that
numerous forms of government regulation, such as large lot zoning
and rent control, impede the efficiency of housing markets and gener-
ate substantial short- and long-term costs. However, other govern-
ment interventions, such as mortgagor protection laws, may promote
economic efficiency in ways that are not immediately apparent, nor
easily provable. In our efforts to improve the efficient operation of the
housing market, we should be careful not to substitute slogans and
truisms for theory and empirical evidence.
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